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ABSTRACT
The United States spends nearly $1,000 per person annually on
drugs—forty percent more than the next highest spender, Canada, and
more than twice the amount France and Germany spend. Although
myriad factors contribute to high drug spending in the United States,
intellectual property law plays a crucial and well-documented role in
inhibiting access to cheaper, generic medications. Yet, for the most
part, the discussion of the relationship between intellectual property
law and drug spending has centered on patent protection. Recently,
however, a few researchers have turned their attention to a different
avenue of exclusivity—trademark law. New studies suggest that phar-
maceutical trademarks are diminishing the ability of physicians and
consumers to accurately understand the relationship between generic
and brand name medications. This Article synthesizes and relies on
that research to demonstrate that trademarks in the pharmaceutical in-
dustry are at odds with the theoretical foundations of trademark law.
The conventional justification for trademark protection is two pronged:
trademarks not only minimize consumer confusion but also ensure
manufacturers maintain consistent product quality. Relying on pharma-
ceutical case studies and behavioral research, this Article contends
that pharmaceutical trademarks and trade dress are performing the op-
posite functions. Instead of reducing consumer confusion and enhanc-
ing market efficiency, pharmaceutical trademarks are actually
confusing patients into believing that trademarked and generic drugs
are distinct medications, leading to wasteful spending and even sub-
stantial morbidity. Accordingly, this Article encourages policymakers
to reexamine the utility of trademarks in the pharmaceutical industry
and ultimately suggests that such trademarked names should be re-
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Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Thanks to Amy Kapczynski, Aaron Kesselheim, David
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placed with a different type of mark—one that serves to distinguish a
drug’s manufacturer without differentiating the drug itself from identi-
cal generics. Such an approach has the potential to not only save mil-
lions of dollars, but also improve patient outcomes.
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INTRODUCTION
For decades, economists, legal scholars, and public health advocates
have documented the role intellectual property laws play in inhibiting access
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to cheaper, generic medications. Yet, for the most part, these studies have
focused on the relationship between patent law and public health: how does
patent protection impede access to generic medicines? In the last thirty
years, the experts and regulators have had much to discuss. Major changes to
both domestic laws—such as the Hatch-Waxman Act—and international
agreements—such as the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights Agreement (“TRIPS”)—have modified the scope of patent protec-
tions at the intersection of intellectual property law and public health.
But patents are not the only form of intellectual property that influence
access to medications. Increasingly, policymakers and scholars are examin-
ing the potential negative impact of trademark law on public health. Trade-
marks are intended to provide consumers with accurate information
regarding the source of a product, therein lowering consumer search costs
and facilitating market efficiency. In a world replete with consumer options,
trademarks enable buyers to differentiate between the Cokes® and Pepsis®
to locate the particular good they desire. These marks greatly reduce the
confusion that the breadth of market options could otherwise generate.
Recent research, however, reveals that pharmaceutical trademarks tend
to perform the opposite function. New studies show that pharmaceutical
trademarks induce consumers to artificially differentiate between bioe-
quivalent branded and generic medications, leading to wasteful spending and
even substantial morbidity.1 Instead of reducing consumer confusion, phar-
maceutical trademarks create it; instead of enhancing market efficiency, they
diminish it.
Cognizant of this issue, interest in the utility of pharmaceutical trade-
marks, or lack thereof, has grown in recent years. In 2012, the Indian Minis-
try of Health announced that it would prohibit the use of brand names for
pharmaceutical products due to the detrimental impact such trademarks have
on the demand for generic medications.2 Although Indian officials have
since decided against a total ban, a version of the proposal is still under
consideration.3 In a country where many people buy branded medications
due to ignorance of brand and generics bioequivalence, such a law could
change purchasing behaviors and significantly lower health care
expenditures.4
1. See infra Part II & III.A.
2. Kounteya Sinha, Health Ministry Pushes for End to Sale of Branded Drugs, THE
ECON. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2012, 7:40 AM), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-
10-16/news/34498956_1_generic-drugs-generic-names-generic-medicines.
3. No New Licences for Drug Brands, DAWN (Nov. 26, 2012, 6:25 AM), http://www
.dawn.com/news/766813/no-new-licences-for-drug-brands (quoting the Drug Controller Gen-
eral of India, Dr. G.N. Singh,“[w]e want to gradually move towards a future where we will not
issue any brand or trade names. We are going all out to push generic drugs solely for the
benefit of the public.”).
4. Although the price differences between generic and brand name products in India
are significant, there are also substantial differences in the prices of generics in India. See
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While India’s consideration of a ban on pharmaceutical trademarks may
be relatively recent, the realization driving the ban is not. After analyzing the
effects of trademark protection on the pharmaceutical market, a 1977 U.S.
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) report suggested that “the trademark,
like the patent, might be given a limited life” due to the social costs of
trademarks in perpetuity.5
Lawmakers have yet to act upon the FTC’s 1977 suggestion. This Arti-
cle contends that pharmaceutical trademarks and trade dress continue to in-
duce irrational behavior in consumers, needlessly inflating health care costs
and dangerously reducing patient adherence to generic drug regimens. Rely-
ing on pharmaceutical case studies and behavioral research, this Article
demonstrates that pharmaceutical trademarks and trade dress lead patients to
believe that branded drugs are different from and/or superior to their generic
counterparts. This confusion prompts inefficient and even unhealthy pre-
scription practices and purchasing behaviors. While trademarks may facili-
tate consumer knowledge and market efficiency in other arenas, they are
leading to market failure in the pharmaceutical industry. In light of these
findings, policymakers should eliminate pharmaceutical trademarks and
trade dress and, instead, require manufacturers to label drugs with their ge-
neric names and a mark identifying the manufacturer. Such a labeling sys-
tem would clarify the equivalence of brands and generics while still allowing
consumers to identify a drug’s source.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides an
overview of trademark law and the scholarly debate surrounding the impact
of trademarks. Relying on quantitative and qualitative data, Part II argues
that pharmaceutical branding actually increases consumer confusion rather
than reducing it. This Part also contends that consumers do not rely on phar-
maceutical trademarks to ascertain a drug’s source—that is, the manufac-
turer. Part II concludes that pharmaceutical trademarks undermine the key
purpose of trademark law. Finally, Part III offers a solution—the replace-
ment of pharmaceutical trademarks and trade dress with manufacturer
marks—and explores its potential limitations.
I. TRADEMARK THEORY
A. Introduction to Trademarks
At the most basic level, a trademark is a distinctive symbol, name, or
packaging that signals the origin of a particular product and distinguishes it
generally Anita Kotwani, Prices & Availability of Common Medicines at Six Sites in India
Using a Standard Methodology, 125 INDIAN J. MED. RES. 645 (2007) (analyzing the price
differences between brand name and various generic medications for essential medicines on
the Indian pharmaceutical market).
5. FED. TRADE COMM’N, STAFF REPORT ON SALES, PROMOTION, AND PRODUCT DIFFER-
ENTIATION IN TWO PRESCRIPTION DRUG MARKETS 80 (Feb. 1977).
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from others.6 Trademarks need not be new or previously unused to obtain
protection, but they must communicate the product’s true source to consum-
ers. In doing so, trademarks ostensibly enhance the ease with which produc-
ers speak to consumers and enable consumers to differentiate between the
goods available in any given market.
As a form of intellectual property, trademarks endow their owners with
an exclusive right to use the distinctive name, symbol, or packaging se-
lected. Unlike patents and copyrights,7 the Constitution does not directly
protect trademarks.8 Instead, the federal power to grant and regulate trade-
marks derives from the Constitution’s Commerce Clause: trademarks en-
hance the flow of commerce by helping consumers identify products.9 This
generalized objective of stimulating commerce is distinct from the particu-
larized aim of patent and copyright law: the stimulation of specific types of
economic activities, namely in the arts and sciences.10 In contrast to patent
and copyright law, trademark law principally functions as a form of tort law,
protecting consumers from unfair competition and consumer deception.11
While trademarks have existed for “almost as long as trade itself,”12
U.S. trademark law remained the dominion of the courts until Congress en-
acted the first trademark statute in 1870.13 Today, the Lanham Act protects
trademarks.14 When Congress enacted the Lanham Act in 1946, the scope of
trademark law was relatively narrow—advertising slogans, trade names, and
product packaging were not protectable as trademarks.15 These restrictions,
6. See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION § 3:1 (4th ed. 2014) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127) (“Under the modern definition of the
term ‘trademark,’ both the common law and federal law follow the definition set forth in the
federal Lanham Act: a trademark is a designation used ‘to identify and distinguish’ the goods
of a person. Thus, the role that a designation must play to become a ‘trademark’ is to identify
the source of one seller’s goods and distinguish that source from other sources.“).
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. (endowing Congress with the power to enact laws for
the protection of patents and copyrights, “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.”).
8. See The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879); MCCARTHY, supra note 6,
§ 6:2.
9. BARTON BEEBE ET AL., TRADEMARKS, UNFAIR COMPETITION, AND BUSINESS TORTS
27 (2011).
10. Id. at 13.
11. See id. at 27 (citing Mark McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark
Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839 (2007)).
12. BEEBE, supra note 9, at 25.
13. Enacted pursuant to Congress’s powers under the Patent and Copyright Clause, the
first trademark statute was quickly struck down by the Supreme Court as beyond the scope of
the congressional power. See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94. In response, Congress en-
acted another trademark statute in 1881, this time using its Commerce Clause power. See
BEEBE, supra note 9, at 26.
14. The Lanham Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1051, et seq. (2012).
15. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 374 (1999);
see also Walter J. Derenberg, The Lanham Act of 1946: Practical Effects and Experiences
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in part, arose from the common law’s requirement that a trademark be af-
fixed to particular product in order to receive protection. But, in a larger
sense, the prevailing understanding behind these restrictions was that con-
sumers did not rely on slogans, trade names, and product packaging to iden-
tify the source of a particular product, and therefore such properties did not
merit trademark protection.16
Nevertheless, the courts, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(“USPTO”), and, to a lesser extent, Congress have since widened the scope
of trademark protection to shelter slogans, trade names, and trade dress.
While the term “trademark” encompasses words, names, symbols, devices,
or combinations thereof, “trade dress” means a product’s packaging or de-
sign. A drug’s size, shape, and color are aspects of its trade dress, and these
features may also qualify for protection. Under the Lanham Act, producers
may technically obtain a trademark on any distinctive word,17 name,18 sym-
bol,19 device,20 packaging,21 or design22 as long as the producer uses that
mark in commerce23 to signal the good’s source.24 These marks must be used
to identify and distinguish a producer’s goods “from those manufactured or
sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is
unknown.”25 Courts have extended the scope of protectable subject matter to
colors,26 taste,27 sound,28 and smell.29
The current broad scope of trademark protection does have limits.
Before a producer may obtain a trademark, she must demonstrate that her
After One Year’s Administration, 38 Trademark Rep. 831, 834 (1948). Nevertheless, advertis-
ing slogans and trade dress were protectable as trademarks under state unfair competition law
at this time.
16. Lunney, supra note 15, at 374.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012). Although trade dress can be registered with the Patent and
Trademark Office under the Lanham Act, most trade dress and product configurations are
protected without registration under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act due to their “complex
and changing nature.” BEEBE, supra note 9, at 41.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012).
23. Id. § 1127.
24. See Barton Beebe, Search and Persuasion in Trademark Law, 103 MICH. L. REV.
2020, 2028-29 (2005).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012).
26. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159 (1995) (holding that a
green-gold color for dry cleaning press pads qualified for trademark registration).
27. See In re N.V. Organon, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d 1639 (T.T.A.B. 2006) (holding that taste,
like color, only qualifies for registration upon a showing of secondary meaning).
28. See In re Gen. Elec. Broad. Co., Inc., 199 U.S.P.Q. 560 (T.T.A.B. 1978) (holding
that “Ship’s Bell Clock” qualifies for registration if producer could show acquired
distinctiveness).
29. See In re Clarke, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1238 (T.T.A.B. 1990) (holding that the plumeria
flower fragrance on sewing thread and embroidery yarn qualifies for registration).
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mark is distinctive.30 Some marks, such as those that are fanciful,31 arbi-
trary,32 or suggestive,33 are inherently distinctive; others, such as descriptive
marks,34 are only protectable if they have acquired a secondary meaning in
the minds of consumers.35 Importantly, generic marks are not protectable at
all.36 Therefore, generic names of drugs cannot be trademarked.
To qualify as inherently distinctive, trade dress must consist of the prod-
uct’s packaging; trade dress that centers on the product’s configuration or
design cannot be inherently distinctive.37 Though murky, the distinction be-
tween product packaging and design rests on whether the dressing merely
indicates the origin of the product (product packaging) or serves to enhance
the product’s appeal or usefulness (product design).38 A product’s useful fea-
tures cannot be trademarked because a producer cannot trademark any prod-
uct feature that “is essential to the use or purpose of the article or . . . affects
the cost or quality of the article.”39
Some academics rationalize the growth in scope of trademark protection
as a necessary corollary to market expansion and product diversification in
the twentieth century.40 Other academics, however, note “much of this ex-
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2012); KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I,
Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 122 (2004).
31. Fanciful trademarks are coined words or phrases that have no inherent meaning or
relationship to the product they mark (for example, Pespi®, Kodak®, or Exxon®). See
Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 791 (5th Cir. 1983), abrogated
on other grounds by KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111
(2004).
32. Arbitrary trademarks are those that bear no semantic relationship to the products
that they mark, but consist of a preexisting word or phrase, for example, Apple® for com-
puters and Camel® for cigarettes. See Zatarains, 698 F.2d at 791.
33. Trademarks such as Coppertone® or Amtrak® are classified as suggestive marks
because, although these trademarks do not technically describe their products, they suggest a
meaning in the consumer’s mind. Id. at 791.
34. Descriptive marks “identif[y] a characteristic or quality of an article or service.”
Vision Center v. Opticks, Inc., 596 F.2d 111, 115 (5th Cir. 1979). For example, American
Airlines® qualifies as a descriptive mark because it identifies the type of airline.
35. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
In Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc, Judge Friendly created a test, now known
as the Abercrombie Test, under which trademarks are classed as generic, descriptive, sugges-
tive, arbitrary, or fanciful.
36. Generic marks are those that describe an entire type or category of products (for
example, use of the word “escalator” to describe a particular brand of escalators). See id. at 9;
BEEBE, supra note 9, at 59. A mark can become generic when enough of the population begins
to use it not to indicate a particular product, but rather to describe a type of product. For
example, the once-trademarked words Xerox and Kleenex are now arguably generic because
they have become synonymous with photocopying machines and tissues, respectively. See
BEEBE, supra note 9, at 70-71, 75-77.
37. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 212, 216 (2000).
38. Id. at 212-13.
39. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001) (quoting Qual-
itex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995)).
40. See Lunney, supra note 15, at 374.
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pansion has little to do with any plausible concern over consumer deception
and rests squarely on the sense that someone who creates something of value
ought to receive the fruits of her labors.”41
B. Quality Insurers or Desire Manipulators? The Scholarly Debate Over
the Effect of Trademark Protection
The conventional justification for trademark protection is two pronged:
Trademarks minimize consumer confusion and ensure manufacturers main-
tain consistent product quality.42 Because trademarks enable consumers to
locate specific products, these marks reduce the consumer confusion that a
marketplace replete with options could otherwise generate. As Judge Easter-
brook explained in Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., “[b]y identifying
the source of the goods, [trademarks] convey valuable information to con-
sumers at lower costs. Easily identified trademarks reduce the costs consum-
ers incur in searching for what they desire, and the lower the costs of search
the more competitive the market.”43
In theory, trademarks also provide producers with incentives to manu-
facture products of consistent quality; a trademark is only valuable insofar as
consumers trust that all products bearing its mark are of the same quality. As
J. Thomas McCarthy explains in his canonical treatise on trademark law:
Since a trademark is not only a symbol of origin, but a symbol of a
certain type of goods or services and their level of quality, a sudden
and substantial change in the nature or quality of the goods sold
under a mark may so change the nature of the thing symbolized that
the mark becomes fraudulent and/or that the original rights are
abandoned.44
The scholarly debate over the impact of trademark law and the appropri-
ate scope of its protection centers on a normative disagreement regarding
which party—the consumer or the producer—ultimately controls the value
of a trademark. Are we “impossibly utilitarian consumers,”45 who coolly and
rationally evaluate the worth of a particular good, or are we “Pavlovian
fools,”46 who fall prey to corporate manipulation of our desires and opin-
ions? The following sections explore each side of this debate via the theories
of their key proponents. Informed by business and advertising literature, the
final section reexamines a legal perspective on trademarks.
41. Id.; see also BEEBE, supra note 9, at 26-27.
42. See MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 3:2; BEEBE, TRADEMARKS, supra note 9, at 30.
43. 772 F.2d 1423, 1429 (7th Cir. 1985).
44. MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 17:24 (internal footnote omitted).
45. Beebe, supra note 24, at 2023.
46. Id.
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i. The Economic Model of Trademark Law
Many legal scholars argue that trademark law promotes economic effi-
ciency by encouraging firms to cater to the desires of rational consumers.47
The originators of this argument—known as the economic model of trade-
mark law—are Richard Posner and William Landes. They argue that the
exclusive right to trademark protection encourages producers to improve the
quality of their products.48 They warn that, without strong trademark protec-
tion, imitators will free ride on the goodwill the primary producer has ac-
quired for her mark and “eventually destroy the information capital
embodied in a trademark.”49 These scholars fear that the prospect of free
riding may “eliminate the incentive to develop a valuable trademark in the
first place.”50
One must recognize that this argument assumes consumer valuations of
trademarks reflect the quality of the products they mark. As trademark
scholar Barton Beebe explains, under the economic model of trademark law,
the consumer “satisfies exogenously determined preferences, on which
trademarks are said to have no effect.”51 Thus, Landes and Posner dismiss
“the power of brand advertising to bamboozle the public and thereby pro-
mote monopoly.”52
Yet, Landes and Posner are not blind to their assumption.53 They ac-
knowledge that the notion of an entirely rational consumer appears at odds
with the reality of purchaser brand preferences, even when the branded and
generic goods are “produced according to an identical formula, such as aspi-
rin or household liquid bleach.”54 Nevertheless, Landes and Posner argue
that such preferences can still be understood as rational if they stem from
concerns about manufacturing competencies:
The fact that two goods have the same chemical formula does not
make them of equal quality to even the most coolly rational con-
sumer. That consumer will be interested not in the formulation but
47. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic
Perspective, 30 J.L. & Econ. 265, 266 (1987); Peter S. Menell, Intellectual Property: General
Theories, 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 129, 149 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit
De Geest eds., 2000); Jerre B. Swann, Sr., Dilution Redefined for the Year 2002, 92 TRADE-
MARK REP. 585, 617 (2002).
48. Landes & Posner, supra note 47, at 265-66.
49. Id. at 270.
50. Id.
51. Beebe, supra note 24, at 2023.
52. Landes & Posner, supra note 47, at 274-75.
53. See id. at 274 (“We have assumed that a trademark induces its owner to invest in
maintaining uniform product quality, but another interpretation is that it induces the owner to
spend money on creating, through advertising and promotion, a spurious image of high quality
that enables monopoly rents to be obtained by deflecting consumers from lower-price substi-
tutes of equal or even higher quality.”).
54. Id.
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in the manufactured product and may therefore be willing to pay a
premium for greater assurance that the good will actually be manu-
factured to the specifications of the formula. Trademarks enable the
consumer to economize on a real cost because he spends less time
searching to get the quality he wants.55
Therefore, Landes and Posner rationalize the need for trademarks even
among formulaically identical products based on the risk of human error in
the reproduction of those formulas. Part II.D will revisit this argument, as it
is critical to assessing the value of trademark protection in the pharmaceuti-
cal industry, where generic medications are bioequivalent to branded
medications.
ii. Trademarks as Artificial Product Differentiators
In contrast to Landes and Posner’s inherent trust of consumer rational-
ity, other legal scholars are skeptical of the capacity of trademarks to en-
hance economic efficiency. These scholars recognize that producers have
both the incentive and ability to manipulate consumer goodwill through ad-
vertising and marketing. They argue that trademark protection thwarts com-
petition and creates monopolistic returns to producers by artificially
differentiating between products. Although this view of trademark law is not
the dominant one, it has maintained a strong contingency of supporters since
the early twentieth century.56 Despite its overall decline in popularity, it has
enjoyed a recent surge in recognition due to the rise of behavioral
economics.57
Economist Edward Chamberlin’s publication of The Theory of Monopo-
listic Competition in 1933 largely drove the scholarly community’s acknowl-
edgement of the anticompetitive effects of trademark law.58 Chamberlin
explained that strong trademark protection enables a producer to differenti-
ate his product and persuade consumers that his brand, and only his brand,
will satisfy the consumers’ demand.59 This manipulation, in turn, allows the
producer to achieve a monopoly in his distinct market.60 Nevertheless,
55. Id. at 275 (emphasis added).
56. See BEEBE, supra note 9, at 32.
57. See Beebe, supra note 24, at 2023 (citing Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Ap-
proach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A.
Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 630, 640-93 (1999)).
58. See BEEBE, supra note 9, at 32; Lunney, supra note 15, at 368.
59. EDWARD CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 56, 204
(1933).
60. Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 567 (9th Cir. 1968) (“[T]o the extent that
[brand] advertising [succeeds] . . . the trademark is endowed with sales appeal independent of
the quality or price of the product to which it is attached; economically irrational elements are
introduced into consumer choices; and the trademark owner is insulated from the normal pres-
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Chamberlin did not argue that trademarks have no utility;61 he recognized
the value of product differentiation and its corresponding ability to reduce
consumer search costs. But one of the primary achievements of Chamber-
lin’s work was revealing the economic inefficiency of trademark protection.
Through artificial product differentiation, trademark protection enables man-
ufacturers to capture consumer loyalty in a detrimental manner.
Chamberlin’s contemporary, Frank Schechter, also appreciated the im-
portance of artificial product differentiation. In The Rational Basis of Trade-
mark Protection, Schechter argued “the value of the modern trademark lies
in its selling power.”62 He explained that “this selling power depends for its
psychological hold upon the public, not merely upon the merit of the goods
upon which it is used, but equally upon its own uniqueness and singular-
ity.”63 Ultimately, Schechter recognized that consumers often pursue distinc-
tiveness for its own sake.”64
The work of Chamberlin and Schechter not only influenced the views of
fellow scholars, but also swayed lawmakers and judges.65 Justice Frank-
furter’s famous trademark opinion in Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Manu-
facturing Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co. bears the imprint of Schechter’s and
Chamberlin’s observations:
A trademark is a merchandising short-cut which induces a purchaser
to select what he wants, or what he has been led to believe he
wants. The owner of a mark exploits this human propensity by mak-
ing every effort to impregnate the atmosphere of the market with the
drawing power of a congenial symbol. Whatever the means em-
ployed, the aim is the same—to convey through the mark, in the
minds of potential customers, the desirability of the commodity
upon which it appears.66
In contrast to Landes and Posner, Frankfurter emphasizes the endogeneity of
a particular trademark’s value: a trademark acquires worth not simply
through the quality of the product it marks, but also through the producer’s
ability to persuade consumers that the mark itself is valuable.
Despite their influence in the early and mid-twentieth century,
Chamberlin and Schechter’s arguments began to lose traction within the le-
sures of price and quality competition. In consequence the competitive system fails to perform
its function of allocating available resources efficiently.”).
61. CHAMBERLIN, supra note 59, at 85 (“The main point I want to make is that the
welfare ideal itself (as well as the description of reality) involves a blend of monopoly and
competition.”).
62. Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV.
813, 830-31 (1927).
63. Id.
64. Beebe, supra note 24, at 2043-44.
65. Lunney, supra note 15, at 368.
66. 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942) (emphasis added).
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gal community in the second half of the twentieth century. Some trademark
scholars began to argue that trademarks were simply property, not monopo-
listic tools.67 They ridiculed those who believed that trademarks led to mo-
nopolies as “infected with monopoly-phobia.”68 Like Landes and Posner,
these theorists contended that trademarks simply enable consumers to distin-
guish between competing goods.69 Today, the courts largely subscribe to
Landes and Posner’s economic analysis of trademark law.70
Chamberlin and Schechter’s arguments, however, are far from dead. In
the second half of the twentieth century, the work of Ralph Brown reaf-
firmed Chamberlin’s core points.71 An avid trademark restrictionist, Brown
viewed trademark law as an instrument of consumer manipulation:
Most advertising . . . is designed not to inform, but to persuade
and influence.
. . . .
. . . [D]oes the sovereign consumer have real freedom of choice? . . .
National advertising is dominated by appeals to sex, fear, emula-
tion, and patriotism, regardless of the relevance of those drives to
the transaction at hand. The purchase of many advertised articles,
then, has a raw emotional origin. Many others are compelled by the
endless reiteration of the advertisers’ imperative: eat lemons, drink
milk, wear hats. Pseudo-information fills any gaps. It takes many
forms. There is the bewildering manipulation of comparatives and
superlatives: “No other soap washes cleaner”; “The world’s most
wanted pen.”72
Despite this cynicism, Brown, like Chamberlin, recognized that advertising
could serve a useful function insofar as it provides truthful information to
67. See Lunney, supra note 15, at 370.
68. See Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd., 137 F.2d 955, 958 (2d Cir. 1943)
(“There are some persons, infected with monopoly-phobia, who shudder in the presence of any
monopoly.”). See also Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34, 42 n.18 (2d Cir. 1945)
(Frank, J., concurring); 1 RUDOLF CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-
MARKS § 15.5, at 225 (2d ed. 1950) (arguing that judicial monopolophobia improperly limited
the scope of trademark protection); Beverly W. Pattishall, Trademarks and the Monopoly Pho-
bia, 50 MICH. L. REV. 967 (1952).
69. See Lunney, supra note 15, at 369.
70. See BEEBE, supra note 9, at 28; Lunney, supra note 15, at 371-72 (“[C]ourts and
commentators succumbed to ‘property mania’–the belief that expanded trademark protection
was necessarily desirable so long as the result could be characterized as ‘property.’”).
71. See Ralph S. Brown, Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade
Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1171 n.29 (1948), reprinted in 108 YALE L.J. 1619, 1638 (1999)
(citing CHAMBERLIN, supra note 59).
72. Brown, supra note 71, at 1169, 1182.
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consumers.73 Beyond this informational value, Brown believed that advertis-
ing often wastes resources74 and induces irrational consumer preferences.75
Brown rejected the notion that the law should protect a trademark as prop-
erty in and of itself.
Legal scholars continue to analyze the occasional anticompetitive ef-
fects of trademark law.76 Some of these scholars have argued that consumers
are victims of the persuasive effects of well-designed trademarks,77 while
others are more wary of this characterization of consumer freewill.78 Yet, all
of these scholars acknowledge that heightened trademark protection can in-
efficiently impede competition through artificial product differentiation.79 As
one intellectual property scholar notes, “the economic case for brands and
advertising is undone to the extent that trademarks are used in ways that
affirmatively confuse consumers.”80
iii. Business and Advertising: Non-Legal Perspectives
on the Value of Trademarks
Lawyers are not alone in investigating the persuasive, non-informational
function of trademarks.81 In the fields of business, marketing, and advertis-
73. Id. at 1168, 1182 (“From the point of view of the economic purist, imparting infor-
mation is the only useful function of advertising” and consumers should be “willing to pay the
necessary price for information”).
74. Id. at 1168.
75. Id. at 1182-83.
76. See, e.g., Jeremy N. Sheff, Biasing Brands, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1245, 1272
(2011); Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108
YALE L.J. 1687, 1689 (1999); Lunney, supra note 15, at 420 n.212.
77. See, e.g., Sheff, supra note 76, at 1272 (“Some of a brand’s economic value—and in
some markets perhaps the largest contribution to its value—lies not in the information it con-
veys about the underlying product, but in the consumer’s psychological responses to the brand
itself.”); Lunney, supra note 15, at 420 n.212 (“[T]o the extent that advertising and a trade-
mark successfully generate an unthinking buying response—a trained reaction to the presence
of a trademark where perception of the mark stimulates hand to wallet without conscious
thought—does that represent a legitimate form of welfare enhancement? Were Pavlov’s dogs
happier after they had been trained to salivate at the sound of a dinner bell?”).
78. Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 2099,
2116 (2004) (“Just because advertising creates new preferences in addition to supplying infor-
mation to help satisfy preferences already formed does not mean that the induced preferences
are ‘irrational’ or ‘bad’ or that they should count as a social cost in considering whether to
protect the mark.”); Lemley, supra note 76, at 1692-93 (arguing that the distinction between
informational and persuasive advertising is troubling “because it impels [the conclusion] that
an enormous number of consumers do not really want what they think they want; they have
been duped by unscrupulous marketers.”); Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public
Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1727 (1999) (“Anecdotal evidence sug-
gests that many consumers don’t feel duped, or, in any event, don’t mind being duped.”).
79. See Lemley, supra note 76, at 1695-96.
80. Id. at 1695-96.
81. See, e.g., Roger Feldman & Fe´lix Lobo, Competition in Prescription Drug Markets:
the Roles of Trademarks, Advertising, and Generic Names, 14 EUR. J. HEALTH ECON. 667, 667
(2012). These public health academics note that “trademarks can have anticompetitive ef-
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ing, specialists accept and even laud the ability of producers to use trade-
marks to serve non-informational roles. In the early twentieth century,
branding gurus, such as Earnest Elmo Calkins, began to develop “the idea
that manufacturers should strive to position their brands as concrete expres-
sions of valued social and moral ideals.”82 Calkins advocated a form of ad-
vertising that depicted products as material embodiments of people’s ideals
even if these portrayals were only tenuously related to the product’s func-
tional benefits.83 Today, advertising and marketing specialists take as a given
that brands have a strong psychological impact. Brands can be used to signal
a certain lifestyle or set of values,84 and consumers often derive psychologi-
cal satisfaction from the purchase of brands that reinforce their self-image.85
Trademark law assumes branding exists solely to inform the consumer,
but branding also shows important persuasive effects. Tim Ambler, a leading
business and marketing scholar, notes that consumers make purchases based
on their mental comfort with a particular item, rather than a rational analysis
of the product’s merits. He explains:
Consumer research conducted over the last decade or so suggests
strongly that consumers show very limited desire for receiving and
using “objective” product information. They do not, as a rule, un-
dertake rational, comparative evaluations of brands on the basis of
their attributes or make final judgments among brands on the basis
of such outputs of complex information processing as attitudes and
intentions. This has long been recognised but the belief was that
consumers made some analysis at some stage and kept the selected
brands in a preference set thereafter. More recently, [studies] have
suggested that, in many cases, consumers do not think at all. Their
fects.” Id. They argue that the “[t]he culprit is advertising, which creates a ‘mental tie’ between
the trademark and the physical commodity, leading to several distortions: monopoly power in
the advertised goods; wasteful proliferation of brands; and a distortion in the minds of consum-
ers regarding the desirability of the product.” Id. Neuroscientists have also documented the
distorting effects of trademarks on consumer preferences. See Samuel M. McClure et al., Neu-
ral Correlates of Behavioral Preference for Culturally Familiar Drinks, 44 NEURON 379, 379-
87 (2004). These researchers employed functional magnetic resonance imaging in anonymous
and brand-cued taste tests of Coke® and Pepsi® to reveal how “brand knowledge” affects
preferences. Id. at 380.
82. Douglas B. Holt, Why Do Brands Cause Trouble? A Dialectical Theory of Con-
sumer Culture and Branding, 29 J. CONSUMER RES. 70, 80 (2002) (citing JACKSON LEARS,
FABLES OF ABUNDANCE: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF ADVERTISING IN AMERICA (1995)).
83. Id.
84. Aron O’Cass & Hmily Frost, Status Brands: Examining the Effects of Non-Product-
Related Brand Associations on Status and Conspicuous Consumption, 11 J. PRODUCT &
BRAND MGMT. 67, 67-69 (2002).
85. Tim Ambler, Do Brands Benefit Consumers?, 16 INT’L J. ADVERT. 167, 188-89
(2015).
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findings could be interpreted as meaning that originally random
choices are then maintained if consumers feel them to be right.86
Although these recent studies reveal the irrationality of consumer preference
in an economic sense, Ambler defends the psychological effect of brands:
“[a] consumer is entitled to spend his money in a way that maximizes his
total satisfaction which is a state of his own mind, not an independent analy-
sis of product utilities by a laboratory.”87 In other words, if a consumer
purchases a Gucci handbag to signal her social status or fashion savvy, the
purse’s quality is irrelevant. In that scenario, the brand is important not be-
cause it informs the consumer of the purse’s source, but because it is itself a
commodity; this phenomenon explains why some consumers readily seek
out Gucci handbags they know to be counterfeits. Moreover, researchers
also find that consumers can obtain psychological fulfillment from the famil-
iarity of a brand. Habit often guides brand selection:88 Consumers do not buy
a particular brand because they like it; they like that brand because the habit
of purchasing it is reassuring.89
Trademark law was not designed to protect the psychological merits of
brands. As the history of trademark law makes clear, the law protects brands
to ensure consumers are not deceived—trademarks were intended to play an
informational role. Therefore, marketing research describing the psychologi-
cal impact of branding serves to strengthen the arguments of critics of the
economic theory of trademarks like Brown, Lunney, Chamberlin, and
Schechter.
This research also supports the argument advanced by this Article: phar-
maceutical trademarks are inefficient because their psychological influence
induces consumers to behave irrationally. If trademarks lead patients to be-
lieve that branded medications—and only branded medication—can satisfy
their needs, then pharmaceutical trademarks increase confusion rather than
reduce it.
86. Id. at 185 (internal citations omitted).
87. Id. at 186.
88. Id. at 181 (citing JOHN O’SHAUGHNESSY, WHY PEOPLE BUY (1987)).
89. Ambler, supra note 85, at 187 (“Brand loyalty may reflect, therefore, only the con-
venience inherent in repetitive behavior rather than commitment to the brand purchased.”)
(citing S.H. Chaffee & J. M. Macleod, Consumer Decisions and Information Use, Consumer
Behavior: Theoretical Sources 385 (S. Ward & T.S. Robertson eds., 1973) and Thomas S.
Robertson, Low-Commitment Consumer Behavior, 16 J. ADVERT. RES. 19 (1976)).
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II. ALLERGIC TO GENERICS: CONSUMER CONFUSION ARISING FROM
TRADEMARKS AND DRESS
Brand name pharmaceutical manufacturers have spent billions of dollars
advertising their products90 to ensure that consumers recognize drugs by
their name, color, and shape.91 The trademarks and dress of popular medica-
tions are etched into our cultural conscious and vocabulary. But is this
branding actually useful to consumers? After providing a brief overview of
pharmaceutical trademarks and nomenclature, this Part argues that pharma-
ceutical trademarks not only fail to reduce consumer confusion, but actually
increase it. Furthermore, pharmaceutical trademarks and trade dress do not
play a significant role in ensuring consistent product quality. Drawing on
these conclusions, this Article demonstrates that the harms associated with
pharmaceutical trademarks not only outweigh their benefits, but also cause
the very inefficiencies trademarks aim to prevent.
A. Background: Pharmaceutical Trademarks and Nomenclature
Every drug approved by the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”)
has three separate names: a chemical name, a generic (non-proprietary)
name, and a brand (proprietary) name.92 For example, Tylenol® is the brand
name of the drug that has the chemical name N-(4-hydroxyphenyl) acetam-
ide and the generic name acetaminophen. A drug’s chemical name describes
its chemical makeup, and physicians and pharmacists rarely use this name in
practice.93
A drug’s generic name is usually composed of a medically significant
stem and a chemically significant root, and it directs physicians and pharma-
cists to a particular drug class.94 Like other generic marks, generic drug
names are not eligible for trademark protection.95 In the United States, drugs
90. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PROMOTIONAL SPENDING FOR PRESCRIPTION DRUGS
(2009); Julie M.Donohue, Marisa Cevasco & Meredith B. Rosenthal, A Decade of Direct-to-
Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 673, 673 (2007).
91. See, e.g., Dipak C. Jain & James G. Conley, Patent Expiry and Pharmaceutical
Market Opportunities at the Nexus of Pricing and Innovation Policy, in INNOVATION AND
MARKETING IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 255 (Min Ding et al. eds., 2014) (detailing
the extensive advertising campaign that AstraZeneca undertook to market Prilosec®, a popular
gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD) medication).
92. See Roger Feldman & Fe´lix Lobo, Competition in Prescription Drug Markets: the
Roles of Trademarks, Advertising, and Generic Names, 14 EUR. J. HEALTH ECON. 668 (2012);
Carol Rados, Drug Name Confusion: Preventing Medication Errors, 39 FDA CONSUMER 35,
36 (2005).
93. See Rados, supra note 92, at 37.
94. Dana M. Herberholz, Curing Confusion: An Overview of the Regulatory Complexi-
ties of Obtaining Pharmaceutical Trademarks and A Prescription for Reform, 8 MINN. J.L.
SCI. & TECH. 97, 108 (2007) (citing Rados, supra note 92, at 37).
95. See Linda Gundersen, The Complex Process of Naming Drugs, 129 ANNALS INTER-
NAL MED. 677, 677-78 (1998). It is important to note that the word “generic” has a different
meaning in the context of trademark law as opposed to patent law. Thus far, this paper has
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obtain their generic names from the United States Adopted Names Council
(“USAN Council”),96 which gives generic names to all FDA approved medi-
cations.97 After both the World Health Organization and USAN Council ap-
prove a generic name, the USAN Council publishes that name in the
Trademark Bulletin of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America as well as the Pharmacopeia Forum.98
Drug companies give their medications proprietary names in order to
improve consumer recognition of their products.99 “Unlike a drug’s generic
name, which is intended to describe its function or structure, a proprietary
name is typically coined by consulting firms with expertise in prescription
drug ‘naming.’”100 In contrast to generic drug names, proprietary names are
eligible for trademark protection.101
The FDA is primarily responsible for reviewing and approving proprie-
tary drug names and their subsequent trademarks.102 This authority is rooted
in the FDA’s responsibility to regulate misleading drug labeling.103 The
USPTO also routinely reviews pharmaceutical trademarks.104
used the word “branded” to refer to pioneer drugs – those that are or were once protected by a
patent – and “generic” to refer to their bioequivalent counterparts. As previously discussed, in
trademark law, the term “generic” simply means a name that references the class or type of
product. In the pharmaceutical industry, a generic drug producer – a producer that manufac-
tures a bioequivalent version of a pioneer drug – could choose to give its product a trade-
marked name. Although the drug’s actual generic name cannot be trademarked, the generic
producer could give that drug another name that could be trademarked. For example, Advil®,
Motrin®, and Midol®, are trademarked brands of the generic drug Ibuprofen. Although the
manufactures of Advil®, Motrin®, and Midol® could not trademark the name “Ibuprofen,”
because it is the drug’s generic name, these manufacturers did create different proprietary
names for this drug and trademarked them accordingly. Although Advil®, Motrin®, and
Midol® are all technically “branded” drugs, this paper has used the term “branded” to refer to
pioneer drugs – the drugs that originally received patent protection and therefore were the first
version available. To avoid confusion, this paper will continue to refer to pioneer drugs as
“branded” medications, even though it is also possible for generic drugs to have a brand.
96. The USAN Council “is a private organization composed of three sponsoring organi-
zations: the American Medical Association, United States Pharmacopeia, and the American
Pharmaceutical Association.” Herberholz, supra note 94, at 108 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 299.4(c)
(2015)).
97. Eva Vivian, Overview of Generic Drugs and Drug Naming, MERCK MANUAL, http://
www.merckmanuals.com/home/drugs/brand-name-and-generic-drugs/overview-of-generic-
drugs-and-drug-naming (last visited Oct. 6, 2015).
98. See Gundersen, supra note 95, at 677-78.
99. Herberholz, supra note 94, at 109.
100. Id.
101. See supra Part I.A.
102. Deirdre A. Clarke, Proprietary Drug Name Approval: Taking the Duel Out of the
Dual Agency Process, 12 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 433, 442 (2011).
103. Stephen C. Clifford, The Name Game: Creating a Trademark for a New Drug Prod-
uct, 2 DRUG DEV. & DELIVERY (2002), http://drug-dev.com/Main/Back-Issues/The-Name-
Game-Creating-a-Trademark-for-a-New-Drug-512.aspx; see also 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) (2012);
21 C.F.R. 201.10(c)(5) (2015).
104. See Clarke, supra note 102, at 436-37; Clifford, supra note 103.
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[The] FDA’s focus is patient safety while the USPTO’s focus is
consumer confusion as to the product’s source in the marketplace.49
Specifically, the [FDA] must determine whether there is a potential
safety or health risk based on the proprietary drug name candidate’s
likelihood to be confused with other drug names. . . . The FDA does
not simply focus on the consumer’s confusion but also focuses on
the health care provider or pharmacist’s ability to become
confused.105
Together, the FDA and USPTO attempt to ensure that a drug’s proprietary
name is neither misleading nor confusing to consumers.106
For a given drug, pharmaceutical companies often obtain trademark pro-
tection on the medication’s proprietary name as well as trade dress protec-
tion on the drug’s design (size, shape, and color).107 Although courts have
sometimes invalidated a pharmaceutical firm’s trade dress on the grounds
that the design is functional and not merely decorative,108 most firms are able
to protect the colors and shapes of their medications as long as they can
show that such designs have obtained a secondary meaning in the minds of
consumers.109
Both a pioneer drug’s proprietary name and design are critical to its
competitive advantage once its patents expire and generic producers are able
to enter the market. First, physicians overwhelmingly refer to medications,
irrespective of the availability of generic formulations, by their brand
names.110 Second, because prescription drugs are repackaged at a pharmacy
before they are sold to consumers,111 a medication’s “unique shape and color
105. Clarke, supra note 102, at 442; see also Clifford, supra note 103.
106. Nevertheless, these agencies do not always perform this task perfectly. Instances of
prescription name confusion due to similar product names and/or poor physician writing do
occur.
107. See generally Julia Anne Matheson, Trade Dress Protection: Eye Candy, FINNEGAN
(April 2009), http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=6f96c9cf-
3975-4729-a04d-2e8f2d271a75.
108. See, e.g., Shire U.S. Inc. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., 329 F.3d 348 (3d Cir. 2003)
(holding that the trade dress of Shire’s drug, Adderall, was invalid due to its functionality).
109. See Jeremy A. Greene & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Why Do the Same Drugs Look Dif-
ferent? Pills, Trade Dress, and Public Health, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 83, 86 (2011)
(“[C]laims of trade dress remain vital in the pharmaceutical market.”).
110. Michael A. Steinman, Mary-Margaret Chren & Seth Landefeld, What’s in a Name?
Use of Brand Versus Generic Drug Names in United States Outpatient Practice, 22 J. GEN.
INTERNAL MED. 645, 646 (2007) (finding that physicians use the brand name of a medication
100 percent of the time when the drug does not face any generic competition and use the brand
name 79 percent of the time when generic competition is present).
111. David M. Fritch, Should “The Purple Pill” by Any Other Drug Company Still Be As
Purple? The Changing Face of Trade Dress Protection for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 47
IDEA 171, 181 (2006) (“Prescription drugs, however, are repackaged by the dispensing phar-
macy in bottles which contain no easily identifiable designation of source, unique packaging or
individual labeling trade dress to distinguish it.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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is a crucial means of . . . influencing consumer preference.”112 Pharmaceuti-
cal companies carefully select the trade dress of their products so that a
medication’s design becomes a “fundamental part of [the] drug[’s]
personality.”113
[D]rug companies probe the consumer’s subconscious mind when
they select a drug’s appearance. Glossy, two-tone capsules, for ex-
ample, have a sophisticated look thought to appeal to younger buy-
ers. Color is particularly important: Blue is masculine (Viagra is
blue), red is bold and stimulating, pink is feminine, and As-
traZeneca representatives describe purple as an “attractive yet digni-
fied” shade.114
The effect of trade dress protection on consumer purchasing behavior leads
pharmaceutical companies to invest heavily in the drug naming and design
processes.
B. Consumer Confusion Resulting from Product Differentiation
i. Are Generics and Brands Equivalent?
As discussed in the previous section, trademark theorists justify trade-
marks based on their ability to help consumers differentiate between similar
products, therein lowering consumer search costs and reducing consumer
confusion. To serve this intended purpose, the goods that trademarks distin-
guish must actually be different. If two products are identical, there is no
reason for consumers to distinguish between them: any differentiation would
be artificial. Therefore, to justify the use of trademarks in the pharmaceutical
industry, one must be able to show that generic and brand name medications
actually—or could—differ.115 Yet, all available evidence suggests they do
not.
112. Id.; see also Jain & Conley, supra note 91, at 268.
113. Jill Morton, The Color of Medications: Taking the Color of Medications Seriously,
COLOR MATTERS, http://www.colormatters.com/body_pills.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2013).
114. Charles W. Schmidt, Have I Got a Drug for You!, 4 MODERN DRUG DISCOVERY 41,
41 (2001).
115. When two drugs are similar, but not actually bioequivalent, trademark protection
enables a company to signal these differences to consumers. Under these circumstances, prod-
uct differentiation would not be artificial. In SK & F, Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laborato-
ries, Inc., the Third Circuit confronted such a situation. 625 F.2d 1055 (3d Cir. 1980). The case
concerned two very similar diuretic drugs that contained the same active ingredient, but were
not bioequivalent (the bioavailability, or rate of absorption into the blood stream, of the two
drugs differed). See Greene & Kesselheim, supra note 109, at 84. When the manufacturer of
the generic version of the diuretic medication, Premo, copied branded drug’s color scheme, the
producer of the branded diuretic, SK&F, sued for trade dress infringement. See SK & F, 625
F.2d at 1057-58. The Third Circuit concluded that Premo’s copying of SK&F’s trade dress was
actionable because:
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In 1984, Congress amended the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act
(“FDCA”), leading the FDA to issue regulations requiring bioequivalence
between generic and branded drugs. These regulations ensure that all generic
drugs have the same effects as their brand name counterparts. To qualify as a
generic medication, the producer of such a drug must prove to the FDA that
its drug has the same “dosage form, safety, strength, route of administration,
quality, performance characteristics[,] and intended use”116 as its branded
counterpart.117
Substantial scientific research shows that generic drugs live up to this
test. Many studies document the bioequivalence of generic and brand name
drugs, even for medications with narrow therapeutic indices.118 Studies
SKF’s reputation would be irreparably injured by the substitution of Premo’s prod-
uct for [SK&F’s product] because . . . the two products are not bioequivalents.
Unknowing or willful substitution even if legally permissible would expose SKF not
only to the risk of patient and physician dissatisfaction if the patient reacted to the
substitute drug differently, but also to the risk of suit for the resulting consequences.
SK & F, 625 F.2d at 1066. Thus, the court concluded that Premo’s trade dress merited protec-
tion because it helped consumers distinguish between two products that were actually differ-
ent. Similarly, in Pennwalt v. Zenith Laboratories, a Michigan district court enjoined a
company from manufacturing a version of the diet pill phentermine that possessed similar
trade dress to the brand name version of that drug because the two products were not inter-
changeable. 472 F. Supp. 413 (E.D. Mich. 1979). In both cases, the courts found for the pio-
neer brands because their trade dress actually served its intended function – preventing
consumer confusion between two pills that were not equivalent.
116. Generic Drugs: Questions and Answers, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/drugs/resources-
foryou/consumers/questionsanswers/ucm100100.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2015).
117. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv) (2012); see also Fritch, supra note 111, at 201 (“The
FDA requires that: generic drugs must have the same active ingredients and the same labeled
strength as the brand-name product[,] [g]eneric drugs must have the same dosage form (for
example, tablets, liquids) and must be administered in the same way[,] [g]eneric drug manu-
facturers must show that a generic drug is bioequivalent to the brand-name drug, which means
the generic version delivers the same amount of active ingredients into a patient’s bloodstream
in the same amount of time as the brand-name drug[,][g]eneric drug labeling must be essen-
tially the same as the labeling of the brand-name drug[,] [g]eneric drug manufacturers must
fully document the generic drug’s chemistry, manufacturing steps, and quality control mea-
sures[,] [and][f]irms must assure the FDA that the raw materials and finished product meet
specifications of the U.S. Pharmacopoeia, the organization that sets standards for drug purity
in the United States.”); see also Generic Drugs: Questions and Answers, FDA, http://www.fda
.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/questionsanswers/ucm100100.htm (last visited Jan. 26,
2013).
118. See Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., Seizure Outcomes Following Use of Generic vs.
Brand name Antiepileptic Drugs: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 70 DRUGS 605
(2010); Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., Clinical Equivalence of Generic and Brand name Drugs
Used in Cardiovascular Disease: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 300 JAMA 2514,
2514-25 (2008); see also Greene & Kesselheim, supra note 109, at 86. A therapeutic index is a
comparison between the amount of a therapeutic agent that is responsible for the therapeutic
effect to the amount that causes toxicity.
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on medications that treat cardiovascular disease,119 epilepsy,120 psychiatric
disorders,121 asthma,122 neurologic disorders,123 and dermatologic condi-
tions124 have all found that generic drugs are just as safe and effective as
their branded counterparts. As one study summarized, the FDA’s bioe-
quivalence protocols “have been consistent on a pharmacologic level and
translate into comparable clinical effectiveness for nearly all brand name and
generic drugs.”125 Furthermore, “the FDA has investigated numerous reports
of potential generic product inequivalence, and the Agency has claimed it
cannot document a single example of therapeutic failure when an FDA-des-
ignated therapeutically equivalent product was substituted for its reference
(brand name innovator) product.”126
Despite substantial medical research to the contrary, some healthcare
specialists still argue that there are reasons to differentiate between FDA-
approved generic medications and branded drugs.127 First, a few physicians
dispute the bioequivalence of branded and generic drugs with narrow thera-
peutic indices.128 The next subsection discusses these studies and their poten-
tially flawed results at greater length.
119. See Kesselheim, Clinical Equivalence, supra note 118, at 2524-25 (concluding that
it is “reasonable for physicians and patients to rely on FDA bioequivalence rating as a proxy
for clinical equivalence among a number of important cardiovascular drugs, even in higher-
risk contexts such as the NTI drug warfarin”).
120. Kesselheim, Seizure Outcomes, supra note 118 (finding no difference in seizure
control between generic and brand name epilepsy medications).
121. C. Couprie & B. Lacarelle, Bioequivalence and Therapeutic Equivalence in Psychi-
atry, 30 ENCEPHALE 167 (2004) (demonstrating the bioequivalence of certain psychotropic
drugs).
122. See H. Nell et al., Therapeutic Equivalence Study of Two Formulations (Innovator
v. Generic) of Beclomethasone Dipropionate in Adult Asthmatic Patients, 91 S. AFR. MED. J.
51 (2001) (finding that the generic and branded versions of an important asthma medication
were therapeutically equivalent).
123. P. Zapater P & J.F. Horga, Bio-Equivalence and Generic Drugs: Reflections on
Problems Which May Arise with Drugs Habitually Used in Neurology, 30 REVISTA DE NEURO-
LOGIA 146 (2000) (explaining that although it may be difficult to prove bioequivalence for
certain drugs used to treat neurological disorders, conclusions regarding bioequivalence may
be valid).
124. See John R. Peters et al., Generic Drugs – Safe, Effective, and Affordable, 22 DER-
MATOLOGIC THERAPY 239, 239 (2009) (finding that generic dermatological products were as
safe and effective as their branded counterparts).
125. Greene & Kesselheim, supra note 109, at 86; accord Barbara M Davit et al., Com-
paring Generic and Innovator Drugs: A Review of 12 Years of Bioequivalence Data from the
United States Food and Drug Administration, 43 ANNALS PHARMACOTHERAPY 1583 (2004)
(confirming the bioequivalence of FDA approved generic drugs over a twelve year period).
126. COUNCIL ON SCIENCE AND PUBLIC HEALTH, AMER. MED. ASS’N, GENERIC SUBSTITU-
TION OF NARROW THERAPEUTIC INDEX DRUGS 4 (2002) (emphasis added).
127. See id.
128. See C.L. Fitzgerald & M.P. Jacobson, Generic Substutition of Levetiracetam Result-
ing in Increased Incidence of Breakthrough Seizures, 45 ANNALS PHARMACOTHERAPY e27, at
*1 (2011); see also M.S. Duh et al., The Risks and Costs of Multiplegeneric Substitution of
Topiramate, 72 NEUROLOGY 2122, 2122 (2009).
22 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 22:1
Second, some argue that the manufacturing quality of branded and ge-
neric drugs may differ.129 This argument is distinct from the bioequivalence
argument: it is possible that a generic drug is less effective than its branded
counterpart even though it is bioequivalent because the generic was manu-
factured in shoddy fashion. In such a situation, the purchase of the branded
drug shows more confidence in the company than the drug itself. Because
the consumer presumably cares about the source of her medication, trade-
marks enable her to more readily discern such origins.130 Indeed, as previ-
ously discussed,131 Landes and Posner counter the argument that trademarks
lead to artificial differentiation between formulaically identical products by
pointing out that a consumer may “be willing to pay a premium for greater
assurance that the good will actually be manufactured to the specifications of
the formula.”132
Although there have been some reports of poor drug manufacturing
quality in the past few years, these reports target both branded and generic
manufacturers.133 Many branded drug producers also manufacture generic
medications.134 In these instances, the distinction between the manufacturing
quality of generic and branded drugs may not apply, since the same producer
manufactures both drugs. There are no studies that substantiate the fear of
poor quality generic manufacturing. Such fear is rooted in an unparticu-
larized suspicion of generic quality, rather than real differences between the
two types of drugs.
It is also important to note that the U.S. government independently regu-
lates the quality of pharmaceutical products. Through the FDA, the govern-
ment inspects pharmaceutical production facilities to ensure they are safe
129. See Landes & Posner, supra note 47, at 275.
130. See Signe H. Naeve, Heart Pills Are Red, Viagra Is Blue . . . When Does Pill Color
Become Functional? An Analysis of Utilitarian and Aesthetic Functionality and Their Unin-
tended Side Effects in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 27 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 299, 325 (2011) (“Consumers have the right to know that a generic drug is actually
provided by a different manufacturer and allow them to choose the lower-priced option, rather
than forcing compliance by presenting them with confusing trade dress.”); see also Daniel R.
Bereskin, Brand Name and “Look-Alike” Drugs in Canada after Ciba-Geigy v. Apotex: A
Proposal for Relief from Slavish Imitation, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 1086, 1092 (2004) (“[I]t
surely must also be the case that patients, who have relied upon a medication for many months
or years, including patients who associate the [trade dress] with a particular medicine, believe
that the medicine comes from a particular source and they have learned to trust that source.”);
see also Landes & Posner, supra note 47, at 275 (“The fact that two goods have the same
chemical formula does not make them of equal quality to even the most coolly rational
consumer.”).
131. See supra Part I.B.i.
132. Landes & Posner, supra note 47, at 275.
133. See Katie Thomas, Lapses at Big Drug Factories Add to Shortages and Danger,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/18/business/drug-makers-
stalled-in-a-cycle-of-quality-lapses-and-shortages.html.
134. Natasha Singer, Drug Firms Apply Brand to Generics, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2010,
at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/16/business/16generic.html?_r=0.
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and compliant.135 The FDA conducts over a thousand inspections of domes-
tic facilities per year, inspecting approximately forty percent of domestic
establishments. The Government Accountability Office has estimated that, at
this rate, FDA inspects domestic manufacturers approximately once every
2.5 years.136 The FDA also inspects generic drugs manufactured abroad. Al-
though the FDA inspected these foreign sites less frequently in the past, the
agency is currently ramping up its efforts to regulate overseas facilities.137
For example, the FDA has opened offices in India and China and increased
the number of inspections conducted at foreign pharmaceutical plants.138
This level of regulation is fairly unique: the U.S. government does not
monitor the output quality in most other consumer good and service indus-
tries. Although government agencies may promulgate compliance rules and
regulations for other industries, such as the automobile or power-tool indus-
try, the government does not actively inspect the products of these industries
to ensure that their outputs comport with the relevant regulations.
To be sure, the FDA is not infallible.139 It does, however, provide a
check on the safety and regulatory compliance of pharmaceutical manufac-
turers. Such regulation should ease fears that strong trademark protection is
necessary to ensure product quality.
Finally, some note that generic and branded drugs can differ in their
non-active ingredients, such as the dyes used to create the pill’s color or
filler ingredients.140 But these arguments lack support.141 Even if dyes affect
patients differently, this possibility counsels in favor of abandoning trade
dress protection altogether: if a brand name and generic drug may have
slightly different effects on people due to their color, then the generic pro-
ducer should be allowed to copy the trade dress of the branded drug. Moreo-
ver, if this possibility is a real concern, the FDA should require
pharmaceutical manufacturers to demonstrate that the dyes they use are
135. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-961, DRUG SAFETY: FDA HAS
CONDUCTED MORE FOREIGN INSPECTIONS AND BEGUN TO IMPROVE ITS INFORMATION ON FOR-
EIGN ESTABLISHMENTS, BUT MORE PROGRESS IS NEEDED (2010).
136. Id.
137. Eric Palmer, FDA Cuts U.S. Plant Inspections While Boosting Them Overseas,
FIERCE PHARMA MFG. (Mar. 20, 2014), http://www.fiercepharmamanufacturing.com/story/fda-
cuts-us-plant-inspections-while-boosting-them-overseas/2014-03-20.
138. See FDA, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE FDA FOREIGN OFFICES (2012), available at
http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/FSMA/ucm291803.htm#posts; FDA’s Interna-
tional Posts: Improving the Safety of Imported Food and Medical Products, FDA CONSUMER
HEALTH INFO. (Mar. 2010), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/
UCM187246.pdf.
139. See Peter H. Schuck, FDA Preemption of State Tort Law in Drug Regulation: Find-
ing the Sweet Spot, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 73, 92 (2008).
140. Lesley Alderman, Tips on Generics, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2009), http://. ./2009/12/
19/health/19patientbar.html.
141. About Generic Medicines, GENERIC PHARM. ASS’N, http://www.gphaonline.org/
about/generic-medicines (last visited Oct. 6, 2015).
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chemically inert. The available research examining the differences between
generic and branded drugs has not found that these types of medications
differ in any real way.
ii. Artificial Product Differentiation in the Pharmaceutical Market
Despite this equivalence, consumers and doctors often prefer branded
medications to generic ones.142 With respect to consumers, a recent AARP
report found that “some adults still consider brand name drugs to be superior
to generic drugs or believe that switching to a generic may compromise the
quality of their medications.”143
Importantly, studies suggest that this preference is grounded in irration-
ality rather than misinformation. In a survey of 2,500 commercially-insured,
prescription drug users, less than 10 percent of participants believed that
generic drugs cause more side effects than branded drugs.144 Slightly more
than 10 percent of study participants disagreed with the statement, “Ameri-
cans should use more generic drugs,” while almost 56 percent agreed.145
When the subjects were asked if they “would rather take generics than
branded medications,” however, only 37 percent agreed, while 26 percent
disagreed.146 Tellingly, “[r]espondents more strongly agreed with the state-
ment that Americans, in general, should use generic drugs than with a state-
ment that they, as individuals, preferred to use generics.”147 Thus, although
consumers favored greater generic drug usage for the U.S. population as a
whole, they found it difficult to take their own advice. These results suggest
that patient decision-making “might not be rational from an economic
perspective.”148
Another study of 505 prescription drug users lends further support to
this conclusion.149 Twenty-two percent of respondents agreed that “generic
substitution limited their ability to get what their doctor had prescribed, and
about 20 percent believed that it would limit their chances of getting the best
142. See Andrew T. Ching, A Dynamic Oligopoly Structural Model for the Prescription
Drug Market After Patent Expiration, 51 INT’L ECON. REV. 1175, 1175 (2010); William H.
Shrank et al., Patients’ Perceptions of Generic Medications, 28 HEALTH AFFAIRS 546, 553-54
(2009); LEIGH PURVIS, AARP PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, STRATEGIES TO INCREASE GENERIC
DRUG UTILIZATION AND ASSOCIATED SAVINGS 7 (2008); LINDA L. BARRETT, AARP, PHYSI-
CIANS’ ATTITUDES AND PRACTICES REGARDING GENERIC DRUGS 18 (2005); Sujit S. Sansgiry,
Monali Bhosle & Nathan Pope, Consumer Perceptions Regarding Generic Drug Substitution:
An Exploratory Study, 17 J. PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETING & MGMT. 77, 82 (2005); Henry G.
Grabowski & John M. Vernon, Brand Loyalty, Entry, and Price Competition in Pharmaceuti-
cals After the 1984 Drug Act, 35 J.L. & ECON. 331, 332-33 (1992).
143. PURVIS, supra note 142, at 7.
144. Shrank, Patients’ Perceptions, supra note 142, at 549.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 549-50.
148. Id. at 555.
149. Sansgiry, Bhosle, & Pope, supra note 142, at 81.
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medications.”150 Nevertheless, a majority of these study participants (61 per-
cent) did not believe that generic substitution increased the number of side
effects they experienced.151 This study confirms that consumers differentiate
between generic and brand name medications for reasons they themselves
recognize may not be grounded in the efficacy of the drugs.
Several studies of prescribers’ behaviors reveal that patients are not the
only ones afflicted by these irrational tendencies. One study found that phy-
sician perceptions of specific drugs more closely resemble the advertising
claims of the manufacturers than actual measures of the drugs’ perform-
ances.152 Another study found that physicians’ interactions with drug compa-
nies influenced their requests that particular drugs be added to their
hospitals’ formularies.153 This result is particularly disturbing given that
“more than one-half of the new drugs requested offered little or no therapeu-
tic advantage over comparable drugs already on the formulary.”154 This
study, among others, supports the notion that pharmaceutical advertising and
promotion induce physicians to prescribe less cost-effective drugs.155 Doctor
and patient irrationality may be mutually reinforcing: as doctors prescribe
more branded drugs, patients are more inclined to believe that they are
superior.
A final anecdote encapsulates the extent and depth of consumer differ-
entiation between generic and branded medications. In a short article regard-
ing the ethics of honoring patient requests for brand name medications when
generic versions are available, Drs. Troyen Brennan and Thomas Lee de-
scribe the case of a woman who claims she is allergic to generic medica-
tions. Here, the patient irrationally views generic drugs as a completely
distinct class of medications:
A 69-year-old woman with diabetes mellitus and supraventricu-
lar tachycardia believes that she is allergic to generic medica-
tions. . . . Her medical problems include arthritis, diabetes mellitus,
hypertension, dyspepsia, and depression. She frequently comes to
the office or the emergency department with symptoms that do not
have an apparent physiologic basis. Over the last decade, she has
undergone a wide range of diagnostic procedures that have not
shown clinically significant abnormalities. A psychiatric consulta-
150. Id. at 82.
151. Id. at 85.
152. See Jerry Avorn, Milton Chen & Robert Hartley, Scientific versus Commercial
Sources of Influence on the Prescribing Behaviors of Physicians, 73 AM. J. MED. 4 (1982).
153. John A. Rizzo, Advertising and Competition in the Ethical Pharmaceutical Indus-
try: The Case of Antihypertensive Drug, 42 J. OF L. & ECON. 89, 93-94 (1999) (citing Mary-
Margaret Chren & C. Seth Landefeld, Physicians’ Behavior and Their Interactions with Drug
Companies, 271 JAMA 684 (1994)).
154. Id. at 93-94.
155. See id. at 113.
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tion 4 years ago led to the conclusion that she had somatization
disorder . . . .
Three years ago, the patient received a generic preparation of
glyburide and developed a rash typical of a drug allergy. The patient
concluded that she was allergic to generic medications and refused
to fill prescriptions for any generic drug. She could not be con-
vinced that allergy to all generic medications, but not to their brand
name counterparts, was impossible. She refused referral to an aller-
gist, asserting that “I know my body.”156
This patient does not mistrust generics because she thinks they may not
work as well or may be manufactured by shoddy producers; instead, she
believes she has a unique, abnormal physiology reaction—an allergy—to all
generic medicines, despite the impossibility of such a reaction.
iii. The Power of Marketing: The Impetus Behind
Artificial Differentiation
The above patient’s conviction likely stems from her exposure to brand
advertising and trademarks. The strategic use of trademarks and advertising
in the pharmaceutical industry drive artificial differentiation in exactly the
way Chamberlin, Schechter, and Brown predicted it would.157 Even when
consumers and physicians logically understand that generic and branded
drugs are equivalent, they have demonstrated an inability to apply this logic
to their own drug decisions.
Pharmaceutical companies use trademarks and trade dress to define their
products and imbue them with an air of uniqueness and originality. As
Schechter argued, “the value of the modern trademark lies in its selling
power” and “this selling power depends for its psychological hold upon the
public, not merely upon the merit of the goods upon which it is used, but
equally upon its own uniqueness and singularity.”158 As the first-movers on
the market for a particular drug, branded manufacturers are able to familiar-
ize consumers with their trademarks and dress and build consumer loyalty to
their brand for a patent period of twenty years before they face any generic
competition.
Pioneer manufacturers capitalize on their first-mover advantage by
heavily promoting their brand to consumers. In 2004, pharmaceutical manu-
facturers spent an estimated $57.5 billion on promotional activities.159 In
2008, spending on direct-to-consumer (“DTC”) advertising totaled $4.7 bil-
156. Troyen A. Brennan & Thomas Lee, Allergic to Generics, 141 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED. 126, 126 (2004) (emphasis added).
157. See supra Part I.B.ii.
158. Schechter, supra note 62, at 831.
159. Marc-Andre´ Gagnon & Joel Lexchin, The Cost of Pushing Pills: A New Estimate of
Pharmaceutical Promotion Expenditures in the United States, 5 PLOS MED. 29, 31 (2008).
Fall 2015] The Cost of Confusion 27
lion, nearly one-fourth of pharmaceutical manufacturers’ expenditures for all
promotional activities.160 These DTC efforts have proved to be highly profit-
able: “[I]n 2001, every dollar spent on DTC advertising resulted in an addi-
tional $4.20 in sales.”161 Pharmaceutical companies also spend significant
sums of money promoting their products to doctors and hospitals.162 In one
survey, four out of five physicians reported that brand name drug representa-
tives visit their practices weekly to advertise pharmaceutical products.163 In
contrast, these same physicians reported they rarely receive promotional
materials from generic companies.164 By saturating the markets for their
medications with their brands, pioneer manufacturers succeed in depicting
their brands as distinctive—the only brand that can fulfill a consumer’s
need. In the end, pharmaceutical advertising, like most forms of advertising,
“is designed not to inform, but to persuade and influence,” and this persua-
sion leads to irrational decision-making based on a false sense of
distinctiveness.165
Branded manufacturers also benefit from the habit-forming behavior
that occurs during their exclusive sales period. As discussed in Part I, habit
often drives purchasing decisions.166 Marketing specialists have found that
consumers derive psychological satisfaction from habit. Their research sug-
gests that patients choose to stay with more expensive, branded medications
because the habit of purchasing the same brands is comforting, not because
they believe the brands are safer or more effective. Information regarding
the bioequivalence of two drugs is likely irrelevant when desire for brand
familiarity drives drug purchasing decisions.
A well-known case study helps illustrate this point. In 1989, the pharma-
ceutical manufacturer, AstraZeneca, introduced a new class of gas-
troesophageal reflux disease (“GERD”) medication known as proton-pump
inhibitors (“PPIs”).167 After obtaining a patent on its new PPI, AstraZeneca
sold the drug, omeprazole, under the proprietary name Prilosec. Many read-
ers will recognize Prilosec as the “Purple Pill” due to its well-publicized
trade dress.
160. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 90, at 1.
161. Herberholz, supra note 94, at 117.
162. The pharmaceutical industry spends more than $7 billion per year on direct market-
ing to doctors. Martha Raffaele, States Combat Drug Reps to Cut Costs, WASH. POST (Mar. 3,
2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/02/AR20080302011
99_pf.html.
163. BARRETT, supra note 142, at 8.
164. Id. at 12.
165. Brown, supra note 71, at 1169, 1181-82.
166. Ambler, supra note 85, at 181.
167. The FDA approved Astrazeneca’s new GERD drug, Prilosec®, on Sept. 14, 1989.
FDA, ORANGE BOOK: APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUA-
TIONS, (2015).
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[P]romotions for the “Purple Pill” appeared everywhere—on TV,
the Internet, and in print ads. The pill’s signature color, purple, was
at the heart of this effort. When prospective patients found their way
to their doctor’s office, “they didn’t even have to recall the drug’s
name. All they had to do was remember its color.”168
While patented, Prilosec sold at a premium price of $4 per pill,169 and, by
2000, it was the world’s top selling drug, earning over $6 billion per year in
the United States.170
Faced with Prilosec’s patent expiration in 2001, AstraZeneca crafted a
marketing campaign that allowed it to transfer the consumer goodwill asso-
ciated with trademark and trade dress of Prilosec to its new patented PPI—
“Nexium.” Although it was marketed as the new Prilosec, Nexium (generic
name, esomeprazole) is, for all intents and purposes, the same as Prilosec:
Prilosec (omeprazole) is a mixture of the active and inactive enantiomers of
the chiral drug omeprazole, whereas Nexium (esomeprazole) is only the ac-
tive enantiomer of the same chiral drug.171 Despite this limited functional
distinction, AstraZeneca obtained patent protection for Nexium.
AstraZeneca marketed Nexium as the “new purple pill,” dying it the
same color. Unsurprisingly, this patented drug was significantly more expen-
sive than the generic versions of omeprazole that came onto the market after
Prilosec’s patent expired. Nexium® was positioned as an improved medica-
tion because, on average, it took shorter time (five days versus seven days)
for GERD patients to experience relief relative to omeprazole. Esomeprazole
likely shows such advantages over omeprazole,172 however, purely because
of its higher dosage.173
168. Fritch, supra note 111, at 188 (2006) (citing Neil Swidey, The Costly Case of the
Purple Pill—The Story of One Blockbuster Heartburn Drug Tells You Everything You Need To
Know About the High Cost of Prescription Medicine, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 17, 2002, availa-
ble at http://articles.mercola.com/sites/articles/archive/2002/12/18/nexium.aspx).
169. Jain & Conley, supra note 91, at 23.
170. Walid F. Gellad et al., Assessing the Chiral Switch: Approval and Use of Single-
Enantiomer Drugs, 2001 to 2011, 20 AM. J. MANAGED CARE e90, e90 (2014).
171. “A chiral drug is a single molecule product that exists in 2 mirror image forms call
enantiomers.” Id. Certain enzymatic processes can “distinguish between the R- (from Latin
rectus for ‘right’) and S- (from the Latin sinister for ‘left’) enantiomers, such that 1 enantiomer
may be responsible for much of pharmaceutical benefit while the other is inactive or even
harmful.” Id. Omeprazole (Prilosec®) is a “racemic mixture of R-omeprazole and S-
omeprazole, while esomeprazole, as it name implies, is isolated S-omeprazole.” Id. The S-
omeprazole enantiomer in Prilosec® and Nexium® is responsible for both drugs’ clinical
properties, while the R-omeprazole enantiomer in Prilosec® is inactive. Id.
172. Id. at e92 (“Esomeprazole 40 mg demonstrated statistically significant efficacy over
omeprazole 20 mg in 2 studies, although it was not superior in 2 other studies.”).
173. Studies that found esomeprazole to be more effective than omeprazole “compared
esomeprazole at a pharmacologically superior dose (40 mg) with omeprazole (usually at a dose
of 20 mg).” Id. at e94. The single-enantiomer Nexium® contains “at least 3 times as much of
the active S-isomer as 20 mg of racemic omeprazole on a per milligram basis.” Id. at e92.
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In addition to launching Nexium, AstraZeneca began to sell an over-the-
counter version of omeprazole.174 Sold in the same dosage as Prilosec, As-
traZeneca’s over-the-counter version of omeprazole came in a salmon pink
pill.175 Nevertheless, AstraZeneca sold this medication in a purple packag-
ing, “suggestive of the association with the original Prilosec purple pill.”176
After a drug’s patent expires, most pharmaceutical companies experi-
ence a dramatic drop in sales revenue due to the aggressive price-based com-
petition that generic manufacturers generate.177 Through its elaborate trade
dress scheme, however, AstraZeneca managed to convert Prilosec sales into
Nexium sales. Although Prilosec sales did fall off the post-patent cliff, Nex-
ium picked them up. In fact, “after esomeprazole’s [Nexium] approval in
2001, its use in Medicaid quickly surpassed omeprazole’s [Prilosec’s] and
peaked at over [one] million prescriptions per quarter in the second half of
2005.”178 Overall, AstraZeneca’s sale of proton pump inhibitor products
(Nexium and over-the-counter Prilosec) remained at about $6 billion per
year for ten years after AstraZeneca’s patent on omeprazole expired.179
AstraZeneca skillful manipulation of Prilosec’s trade dress enabled it to
extend its PPI-based revenue stream. When AstraZeneca reassigned
Prilosec’s trade dress and slogan to its newly patented medication, Nexium,
the manufacturer’s goal was undoubtedly to shift the consumer goodwill as-
sociated with the Prilosec brand to Nexium. By associating its new drug with
the trademarks of its old medication, AstraZeneca transferred the reputation
of one of its products to another. The success of AstraZeneca’s marketing
strategy hinged on the company’s ability to convince consumers previously
taking Prilosec that they should instead begin to purchase Nexium, despite
the fact that their current drug was now available over-the-counter at less
than one-seventh of its previous cost. Although some patients probably
switched to Nexium because they actually believed it was an updated ver-
sion of Prilosec, some undoubtedly switched because the trademark maneu-
ver led them to believe that the drug they wanted—the purple pill—was
Nexium. In other words, AstraZeneca used its trademarks to confuse con-
sumers into buying a more expensive version of the same drug. Effectively
inhibiting robust generic competition, this marketing scheme came at greater
expense to both consumers and payors, ultimately decreasing the efficiency
of the healthcare market. Although the Prilosec-Nexium case study is an
extreme example of trademark manipulation, this case nevertheless reveals
174. Jain & Conley, supra note 91, at 27.
175. Greene & Kesselheim, supra note 109, at 85 (“[C]laims of trade dress remain vital
in the pharmaceutical market.”).
176. Jain & Conley, supra note 91, at 27.
177. Id. at 23.
178. Gellad et al., supra note 170, at e92.
179. Id.
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that trademark protection can be used to capture consumers and keep them
from acting in a rational, efficient manner.
AstraZeneca’s manipulative strategy has become increasingly common
in the pharmaceutical industry. Brand name manufacturers now routinely
rely on a medication’s appearance to corner the generic market for that drug.
As one commentator explains, “During the last decade, hundreds of brand
name medicines have been launched as ‘authorized generics.’”180 An “au-
thorized generic” is identical in appearance to its branded counterpart, ex-
cept that the brand name has been replaced with the generic name and the
original manufacturer’s name is swapped out for the name of the generic
manufacturer (which is often a subsidiary company of the brand manufac-
turer). For example, Johnson & Johnson created a subsidiary, Patriot
Pharmaceuticals, to distribute generic versions of its products that “have the
same taste, color, mouth feel, size and shape as the innovator product.”181
Thus, branded manufacturers are aware of the critical role that trade dress
plays in conditioning consumer preferences for pharmaceutical products and
have capitalized on this phenomenon in order to inhibit competition.
A number of other factors also affect consumer differentiation between
branded and generic drugs. First, the price differential between generic and
brand name drugs may in and of itself generate an artificial signaling effect.
As one brand specialist explains, “Price is one of the first signals picked up
by the market through both its level and the systematic fight against uncon-
trolled sales or discounts: the higher the price, the more selective the
purchase seems to be, implying a positive sales-to-price elasticity.”182 In
other words, consumers perceive price to signal quality. In most markets,
this inference is not a poor one; for many goods and services price often (but
not always) correlates with quality.
In the pharmaceutical market, however, generic drugs are significantly
cheaper than brand name products because generic manufacturers do not
incur the same outlays in marketing, research, and development that brand
name companies undertake.183 Therefore, consumers cannot rationally rely
180. Alfred B. Engelberg, The Case for Standardizing the Appearance of Bioequivalent
Medications, 17 J. MANAGED CARE PHARMACY 321, 322 (2011).
181. About Authorized Generics, PATRIOT PHARM. (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.patriot
pharmaceuticals. com/patriotpharmaceuticals/faqs.html.
182. Bernard Catry, The Great Pretenders: The Magic of Luxury Goods, 14 BUS. STRAT-
EGY REV. 1, 14 (2003).
183. Generic drugs are cheaper than their branded counterparts, in part, because pioneer
manufacturers incur costs associated with the research and development, testing, and FDA
approval of pioneer drugs that generic manufacturers do not bear. Prior to the passage of the
Hatch-Waxman Act, the FDA required generic drug companies to prove the safety and effi-
cacy of their products independently of the brand name manufacturer, “essentially mirroring
the extensive testing process followed by the drug’s initial developer.” See Fritch, supra note
111, at 176. Now, the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act (FDCA) allows generic manufacturers to
submit an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) to obtain FDA approval for their drugs.
See Ching, supra note 142, at 1177-78; Holly Soehnge, The Drug Price Competition and
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on the price differential between generic and brand name products to infer a
difference in quality.
Nevertheless, studies suggest they do.184 A 2008 study found that when
subjects were told that they were receiving a more expensive version of a
pain relief medication, they experienced greater pain relief.185 In this experi-
ment, the subjects were divided into two groups: one group was told the pain
medication they would be given cost $2.50 and the other group was in-
formed that the medication had been discounted to $0.10. After receiving a
series of electric shocks of different levels, the patients that received the
“$0.10” medication reported lower levels of pain relief than those who re-
ceived the “$2.50” medication.186 These results “may help explain the popu-
larity of high-cost medical therapies . . . over inexpensive, widely available
alternatives . . . and why patients switching from branded medications may
report that their generic equivalents are less effective.”187 In a second study
of attitudes towards generic drugs in rural Alabama, participants expressed a
preference for branded medications because of their higher prices.188 “One
participant noted, ‘People always say you buy Domino sugar. It’s the best.
Don’t buy the cheap brand. Buy Domino and you won’t have to use as
much. . . . Domino’s is sweeter. Generic medicine is not as effective as, you
know, the real medicine prescriptions, the strength.’”189
The difference in the prevalence of brand name versus generic drug ad-
vertising may also drive consumer differentiation of these products. As Mark
Lemley explains, advertising may play a signaling role: “[W]e advertise, and
therefore we must sell a good of sufficiently high quality that we can afford
this high-cost expenditure.”190 Therefore, the mere presence of brand name
advertising may lead consumers to believe that branded drugs are of a higher
quality than their generic versions. Most generic manufacturers do not ad-
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984: Fine-Tuning the Balance Between the Interests of Pio-
neer and Generic Drug Manufacturers, 58 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 51, 53 (2003). Under the
ANDA process, generic companies need only prove that their generic drugs are “bioe-
quivalent” to their reference products. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv) (2006). Thus, the ANDA
“permit[s] an applicant seeking approval of a generic drug to avoid the costly and time-con-
suming studies required for a pioneer drug.” Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661,
676 (1990).
184. See Shrank, supra note 142, at 554 (citing Rebecca L. Waber et al., Research Letter
to the Editor, 299 JAMA 1016 (2008)) (explaining that consumer perceptions regarding ge-
neric drug safety “may be associated with the term ‘generic’ itself, which connotes lesser
quality for some product categories or the belief that more-expensive products must be more
effective than cheaper products”).
185. Rebecca L. Waber et al., Research Letter to the Editor, 299 JAMA 1016 (2008).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1017.
188. Keri Sewell, Perceptions of and Barriers to Use of Generic Medications in a Rural
African American Population, Alabama, 2011, 9 PREVENTING CHRONIC DISEASE 1, 2-3 (2012).
189. Id.
190. Lemley, supra note 76, at 1690.
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vertise because their products are interchangeable with those of other ge-
neric manufacturers and they have no way of directing their products to
consumers. This decision bears no relation to generic companies’ capacity to
advertise. Thus, any product differentiation that results from the fact that
brand name manufacturers advertise while generic producers do not is com-
pletely artificial.
Finally, consumer rationality with respect to prescription drug purchases
may be especially susceptible to manipulation due to the unique characteris-
tics of prescription drugs. Unlike consumer decisions regarding other prod-
ucts such as clothing or furniture, patients must rely on the information they
receive from pharmaceutical advertisements and their physicians to a much
greater extent because they cannot observe or understand the functional
characteristics of a particular medication before they buy it. Consumers have
no choice but to over-rely upon marketing signals, like pricing and advertis-
ing, as stand-ins for efficacy or quality. Therefore, advertising and promo-
tion in the pharmaceutical industry have a greater ability to persuade
consumers and influence their decisions than does advertising in industries
where a product’s functional characteristics are more readily perceivable.
Switching between medications can also be much more difficult and burden-
some than changing between different versions of another product. There-
fore, consumer preferences become “sticky,” and consumer willingness to
switch manufacturers is less elastic.
Widespread pharmaceutical advertising linking a particular medication
to a specific proprietary name and pill design has led consumers to believe,
or rather intuit, that the brand—and only the brand—delivers the needed
medication. Instead of understanding Tylenol® as form of acetaminophen,
many consumers perceive a CVS or Walgreen’s bottle of acetaminophen as
the knock-off version of Tylenol®. In effect, pharmaceutical trademarks
confuse consumers into believing that brand name products are actually dif-
ferent from generics. Instead of clarifying the source of the medication for
the consumer, pharmaceutical trademarks lead patients to perceive distinc-
tions where none exist; instead of preventing confusion, they create it. And,
just as Chamberlin and Brown suggested, this artificial product differentia-
tion has enabled brand manufacturers to capture monopolistic returns, inhib-
iting generic competition and making the market for pharmaceutical
products less efficient.
iv. The Placebo Effect: How Artificial Differentiation
Drives Real Differentiation
The pernicious effects pharmaceutical trademarks have on physician and
patient behavior may extend beyond the induction of unnecessary expendi-
tures. Research shows that artificial product differentiation due to trade-
marks and advertising may drive real differences in drug effectiveness: it
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reduces both patient adherence to medication regimens and the placebo ef-
fect that drugs often stimulate.
First, trade dress may reduce patient adherence to drug regimens when
switching from a brand name to generic drug. Patients who regularly take
prescription medications become deeply accustomed to the shape, size, and
color of their medications. Although all pills are imprinted with an identify-
ing code, many patients rely on the shape and color of their medications to
identify them.191 In fact, trusted sources of medical safety information, in-
cluding the FDA, Consumers Union, and Institute of Safe Medication Prac-
tices, “encourage patients to rely on the appearance of their medication for
reassurance that they are taking the right medicine at the right time and to
refrain from taking any medication that looks different without getting pro-
fessional reassurance.”192 This reliance is especially prevalent among pa-
tients who take multiple medications, such as the elderly.193 Because trade
dress protection prevents generic producers from copying the designs of
brand name medications even after patent protection has fallen away,
changes from brand name drugs to generic products may cause patient con-
fusion and result in prescription errors194 and reduced adherence.195
Patient experiences with antiepileptic drugs (“AEDs”) provide specific
examples of the type of adherence problems pharmaceutical trade dress may
create. Recently, studies have reported that bioequivalent generic AEDs may
not have the same clinical efficacy as their brand name counterparts.196
These reports have led many physicians to believe that generic AEDs are not
as effective in preventing seizures as their branded counterparts.197 In fact,
“some physician professional organizations and patient advocates have op-
posed the routine interchange of bioequivalent AEDs,”198 and several states
“have also entertained or passed legislation to limit substitution of generic
AEDs to protect patients from breakthrough seizures.”199 Nevertheless,
“well-controlled studies” support the bioequivalence of generic and branded
AED drugs.200 One study on AEDs followed patients who, accustomed to the
191. Engelberg, supra note 180, at 321; Greene & Kesselheim, supra note 109, at 86.
192. Engelberg, supra note 180, at 321.
193. See id.; Greene & Kesselheim, supra note 109, at 86.
194. See Greene & Kesselheim, supra note 109, at 86.
195. See Aaron S. Kesselheim et al.,Variations in Pill Appearance of Antiepileptic Drugs
and the Risk of Nonadherence, 173 JAMA INT’L MED. 202, 203 (2013); Helle Ha˚konsen et al.,
Generic Substituion: Additional Challenge for Adherence in Hypertensive Patients?, 25 CUR-
RENT MED. RES. OPINION 2515, 2519 (2009).
196. See Christine L. Fitzgerald & Mercedes P. Jacobson, Generic Substitution of Leve-
tiracetam Resulting in Increased Incidence of Breakthrough Seizures, 45 ANNALS
PHARMACOTHERAPY e27 (2011); see also M.S. Duh et al., The Risks and Costs of Mul-
tiplegeneric Substitution of Topiramate, 72 NEUROLOGY 2122, 2125 (2009).
197. See Kesselheim, supra note 195, at 206.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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design of a brand name AED, switched to a generic. The patients found the
change in pill design to be confusing,201 which led them to falter in their pill
regimen adherence. These reductions in patient adherence could have driven
the negative results regarding generic AED efficacy that was reported in
other investigations. As the study’s authors concluded, “[c]hanges in pill
appearance may create a self-fulfilling prophecy in which therapeutically
bioequivalent regimens actually become less clinically effective owing to
induced nonpersistence.”202 Instead of clarifying differences between prod-
ucts, differences in trade dress confused consumers into reduced adherence
to the same product.
A more recent study that examined the effect of changes in pill shape
and color on continued patient use of cardiovascular medications confirmed
these findings. This study found that patients had a 34 percent increase in the
odds of change in pill color preceding an episode of non-persistent pill usage
and a 66 percent increase in the odds of non-persistence after a change in pill
shape.203 As this study concluded, “change in the color or shape of those
medications . . . may contribute to patients’ stopping treatment with their
medications. This factor will increase morbidity and mortality and health
care spending overall because of preventable complications and disease
recurrence.”204
Trademarks and trade dress protection may also cause branded medica-
tions to produce beneficial placebo effects that generic drugs cannot repli-
cate because they do not possess the same trademarks or trade dress. As
previously discussed, a study of the effects of branded versus generic pain
relief medications revealed that study participants experienced greater pain
relief from medications the researchers told them were branded as opposed
to generic.205 In this study, participants received one of four types of medica-
tions: a placebo pill that contained no active ingredient but was marked with
the name of a popular brand of aspirin, a placebo pill with no markings, a
branded pill with an active ingredient, or an unmarked pill with an active
ingredient. For both the placebo and the active ingredient pills, the study
participants reported greater relief from the versions that were branded.206 As
the authors of this study conclude, “[b]randing appeared to supplement both
the inert placebo and the active ingredients to produce more relief than either
placebo or active ingredients alone.”207 Another study demonstrated that pa-
201. Id. at 205.
202. Id. at 206.
203. Aaron S. Kesselheim, et al., Burden of Changes in Pill Appearance for Patients
Receiving Generic Cardiovascular Medications After Myocardial Infarction, 161 ANNALS IN-
TERNAL MED. 96, 99 (2014).
204. Id. at 101.
205. A. Braithwaite & P. Cooper, Analgesic Effect of Branding in Treatment of Head-
aches, 282 BRIT. MED. J. 1576, 1576 (1981).
206. See id. at 1578.
207. Id.
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tient expectations regarding the efficacy of both placebos and pharmacologi-
cally active prescription drugs are linked to the physical attributes of their
pills.208 As Jeremy Greene & Aaron Kesselheim explain:
Although the classic logic of the randomized, controlled trial casts
the placebo effect as a negative foil for measuring therapeutic effi-
cacy, in practice a drug’s effectiveness is still due, to some extent,
to placebo effects. By not allowing a generic version to fully benefit
from the functionality of such effects, differing appearances may
reduce the ultimate effectiveness of certain generic drugs.209
Therefore, “changes in pill appearance may not only deprive patients of
these expectations of efficacy, but potentially even have the opposite ef-
fect—a belief that the newly substituted pill will be less efficacious (the so-
called nocebo effect).”210 Differences in trade dress may therefore lead to
worse health outcomes when a patient switches from a brand to a generic
because the patient no longer receives the appearance-induced placebo effect
that the brand provided.
C. Do Pharmaceutical Trademarks Serve a Quality Control Function?
The second rationale for trademark protection—that brands encourage
manufacturers to maintain consistent product quality because they signal the
source of the product and therefore create accountability—does not fare
much better. As previously discussed, in the case of the pharmaceutical in-
dustry, there is little research suggesting that the manufacturing quality of
brands is superior to that of generics.211 Furthermore, FDA inspection pro-
vides an additional check on generic drug quality.
Qualitative and quantitative evidence suggests that consumers rely on
pharmaceutical trademarks and trade dress to identify the product itself,
rather than validate the quality of the drugs they mark. The story of the
patient who believed she was allergic to generics illustrates this point. The
patient was not concerned with the source or quality of her generic medica-
tions. She refused to take generic drugs because she considered these
medicines to be an entirely separate class of drugs. No part of her calculus
hinged on a recognition of bioequivalence or a corresponding concern about
the quality of generic manufacturers; instead, she made a broad generaliza-
tion about generics as if they were separate products.
208. See Greene & Kesselheim, supra note 109, at 87 (“For decades, studies have shown
that the efficacy of placebo pills varies according to the size, shape, and color of the pills. The
placebo effect is particularly evident in the treatment of patients whose disorder has potential
psychosomatic components, such as anxiety, depression, dyspepsia, impotence, obesity, and
pain.”).
209. See id.
210. Kesselheim et al., supra note 195, at 206.
211. See supra Part II.B.i.
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The consumer surveys regarding patient opinions of generic versus
brand name medications also suggest that consumer mistrust of generic
medications does not stem from legitimate concerns regarding the quality of
generic drugs. Instead, these surveys intimate that such distrust stems from
the irrational belief that brand name drugs are simply the BMWs, Mercedes,
and Porsches of drugs. As the aforementioned study of 505 prescription drug
users suggests, consumer mistrust of generic medications does not directly
correlate with consumer mistrust of generic manufacturers. Therefore, the
“quality control” rationale for trademark protection appears to lack ground-
ing in genuine consumer preferences. Not only does the available data indi-
cate that brands and generics do not differ in quality, but it also suggests that
consumers are not relying on pharmaceutical trademarks as a check on the
manufacturing quality of their medications.
D. Conclusion
The Prilosec® case study illuminates the key problem with pharmaceu-
tical trademarks and trade dress: these forms of intellectual property protec-
tion ultimately allow pharmaceutical manufacturers to artificially
differentiate their products from those of generic manufacturers so that they
can extend the monopolies they enjoyed under patent protection. Consumer
preferences for brand name products do not stem from their mistrust of ge-
neric manufacturers. Instead, patients feel more comfortable consuming
branded medications because advertising and promotion has led them to be-
lieve that trademarked medications are superior to generic drugs. As an em-
pirical matter, this conclusion is wrong. Consequently, pharmaceutical
trademarks predominately result in the artificial and inefficient product dif-
ferentiation that Chamberlin, Schechter, and Brown anticipated. Even if
pharmaceutical trademarks and trade dress help some consumers identify the
products they trust, the harms associated with these marks—including in-
creased health care costs, reduced patient adherence, increased prescription
errors, and the nullification of valuable placebo effects—outweigh any bene-
ficial impact.
III. A NEW SOLUTION: MANUFACTURER MARKS INSTEAD OF TRADEMARK
AND TRADE DRESS PROTECTION
A. The Need for New Strategies
Professor Oren Bar-Gill, a leading scholar in the field of law and behav-
ioral economics, describes the analysis policymakers should use when decid-
ing whether to change irrational consumer behavior through legal
intervention:
The question is not whether individuals make mistakes. Sure they
do. The question is whether these mistakes merit legal intervention.
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. . . .
. . . Do consumers suffer from systematic misperception of the costs
and benefits associated with certain products? And, do sophisticated
sellers respond strategically to consumer misperception? In particu-
lar, do sellers design their products, contracts, and pricing schemes
in response to consumer misperception? . . . [I]s consumer mis-
perception and, specifically, sellers’ strategic response to consumer
misperception welfare-reducing? . . . [Finally,] is legal intervention
warranted and, if so, what type of legal intervention is desirable?212
This Article has shown that for pharmaceutical trademarks and trade dress,
Professor Bar-Gill’s first three questions should be answered affirmatively.
This section sets forth a possible legal solution: the replacement of pharma-
ceutical trademarks and trade dress with marks that solely identify the manu-
facturers of medicines.
The elimination of pharmaceutical trademarks and trade dress may seem
like a drastic step, especially in light of the governmental and private poli-
cies and programs put in place to encourage patients to switch to generics.
On the state side, some governments have passed mandatory generic substi-
tution laws, which require pharmacists to substitute generics for branded
medications when feasible; other states have endorsed permissive generic
substitution, where pharmacists are permitted, but not required, to make the
substitution.213 And some states obligate pharmacists to obtain patient con-
sent prior to generic substitution, while others permit substitution without
such explicit consent.214 For their part, private insurers have implemented
financial penalties in the form of tiered formularies and greater copayments
for patients that take expensive branded medications where generics are
available. Studies have demonstrated that these financial incentives increase
generic drug usage.215
Despite these public and private efforts to encourage generic medication
usage, patient and physician attitudes towards generic medications still result
in suboptimal rates of substitution. For example, one study that analyzed
state-by-state Medicaid prescription drug spending in the year 2000 found
212. Oren Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L.
REV. 749, 749 (2008).
213. See William H. Shrank et al., State Generic Substitution Laws Can Lower Drug
Outlays Under Medicaid, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1383, 1383 (2010) (describing various state laws
aimed at encourage generic drug substitution).
214. See generally id. (finding that states requiring patient consent prior to substitution
experienced the lowest rates of generic substitution after the patent for a popular cholesterol-
controlling medication, Zocor, expired and a generic entered the market).
215. See Thomas S. Rector et al., Effect of Tiered Prescription Copayments on the Use of
Preferred Brand Medications, 41 MED. CARE 398, 398 (2003); Kathleen A. Fairman et al.,
Retrospective, Long-Term Follow-Up Study of the Effect of a Three-Tier Prescription Drug
Copayment System on Pharmaceutical and Other Medical Utilization and Costs, 25 CLINICAL
THERAPEUTICS 3147, 3156 (2003).
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that greater generic drug usage could have resulted in collective savings of
$229 million.216 In fact, improved generic drug substitution would have re-
sulted in total savings of $450 million if the best available prices from each
state had been used nationally. Medicaid spent an estimated $329 million in
2009 to reimburse patients for twenty popular brand name medications for
which therapeutically equivalent generic substitutes exist.217 The study pre-
dicted that state governments would overspend between $289 million and
$433 million on reimbursement for ten popular branded medications whose
patents expired in 2011 and 2012.218 It is important to bear in mind that these
projected expenditures are just for Medicaid, which accounts for about 10
percent of total drug purchasing nationwide.219 Improvements in generic
substitution would also result in additional savings for private payors and
Medicare Part D plans.220 Furthermore, although financial incentives in the
form of copayment differentials and tiered formularies promote generic drug
substitution, healthcare specialists have concluded that “copayment differen-
tials between generic and brand name medications may be insufficient to
motivate generic drug use by some patients.”221 Thus, new policies aimed at
reducing physician and patient resistance to generic substitution are
necessary.
Consumer distrust of generic medications is not only extremely costly,
but also dangerous. Multiple studies have shown that the costs of prescrip-
tion drugs to patients affect their subsequent adherence.222 Because generic
216. Michael A. Fischer & Jerry Avorn, Economic Consequences of Underuse of Ge-
neric Drugs: Evidence from Medicaid and Implications for Prescription Drug Benefit Plans,
38 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1051, 1055 (2003). See also Jennifer S. Haas et al., Potential Savings
from Substituting Generic Drugs for Brand-Name Drugs: Medical Expenditure Panel Survey,
1997–2000, 142 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 891, 891 (2005) (finding that use of branded pre-
scription drugs when identical generics were available constituted approximately 11% of over-
all drug expenditures on prescriptions filled in a nationally representative sample of patients
from 1997-2000).
217. Alex Brill, Overspending on Multi-Source Drugs in Medicaid 7 (Am. Enter. Inst.
for Pub. Policy Research, Working Paper No. 2011-01, 2011) (“As total spending on these
twenty multi-source products was approximately $1.5 billion, this means Medicaid overspent
by 22 percent ($1.5 billion versus $1.17 billion) on these products.”), https://www.aei.org/
publication/overspending-on-multi-source-drugs-in-medicaid.
218. Id. at 11. See also Shrank et al., supra note 213, at 1389 (predicting that patient
refusal of generic substitution will cost state Medicaid programs over $100 million in the year
after the patents for only three medications expire).
219. Shrank et al., supra note 213, at 1389.
220. Id.
221. William H. Shrank et al., Improving Prescription Choices, Adherence to Therapy,
and Medication Management: A Best Practice Advice from the American College of Physi-
cians, 11 (American College of Physicians, Working Paper, 2014) (citing Niteesh K. Choud-
hry et al., Setting Prices for Generic Medications: A Survey of Patient Perception, 2 AM. J.
PHARMACY BENEFITS 33 (2010)).
222. See, e.g., Dana P. Goldman et al., Prescription Drug Cost Sharing: Associations
with Medication and Medical Utilization and Spending and Health, 298 JAMA 61, 61 (2007);
William H. Shrank et al., The Implications of Choice: Prescribing Generic or Preferred
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drugs are less expensive, patients can more readily afford generic drugs and
the financial burden of medication purchase is less likely to disrupt their
adherence to their long-term medication regime.223 Although the elimination
of trademark protection in the pharmaceutical industry is not a magic wand
that would instantly convert all brand name prescriptions into generic ones,
it could improve consumer comfort with generic medications, thereby in-
creasing the rate of generic substitution. As previously discussed, easing the
psychological difficulty of the switch from branded to generic drugs could
improve patient adherence to their medication regimens, reduce prescription
errors, and ensure that generic medications benefit from the placebo effects
that branded medications currently enjoy.224
B. Manufacturer Marks
As Landes and Posner explain, pharmaceutical trademarks and trade
dress could serve a useful function even among identical products if these
marks signal their products’ sources to consumers. Arguably, pharmaceuti-
cal trademarks do not serve this function at all. But another form of property
protection might. A new rule could be implemented wherein all medications
must be accompanied by labels identifying the name of their manufacturers
(for example, a sticker on the pill bottle), but the medication themselves
could only be named, prescribed, and advertised by their generic names. If
the generic names were too unwieldy, the FDA could designate shorter
names for medications to be used in product advertisements.
Under such a rule, pharmaceutical trademarks, including trade dress and
slogans, would be prohibited. In terms of the physical prescription, a generic
drug and its branded equivalent would look and taste identical, using the
same dressing and the same drug name on their pill bottles. The only differ-
ence between medications, both brands and generics, would be a small, addi-
tional label on the dispensed bottle, indicating the manufacturer of the drug.
This rule would enable generic manufacturers to use the same names
and dress as branded products, therein eliminating the type of harmful differ-
entiation trademarks have caused. It would still permit consumers to identify
their medications’ sources. If a consumer had a bad experience with the
quality of a Pfizer drug, that consumer would be able to avoid Pfizer prod-
ucts by simply looking at the label on his medications. Critically, this rule
would impede producer efforts to artificially distinguish between brand
name and generic drugs through the names and designs of their products.
Pharmaceuticals Improves Medication Adherence for Chronic Conditions, 166 ARCHIVES IN-
TERNAL MED. 332, 335 (2006); Deborah A. Taira et al., Copayment Level and Compliance
With Antihypertensive Medication: Analysis and Policy Implications for Managed Care, 12
AM. J. MANAGED CARE 678, 678 (2006).
223. See, e.g., Goldman et al., supra note 222, at 61; Shrank et al., supra note 222, at
332; Taira et al., supra note 222, at 678.
224. See supra Part II.B.iv.
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Under such a rule, consumers would feel more comfortable and less con-
fused when switching to generic medications.
The concern Landes and Posner identify—that even formulaically iden-
tical products can differ due to discrepancies in their manufacturing qual-
ity—though perhaps not a valid concern in today’s pharmaceutical market,
must be considered. Allowing manufacturers to place their names on their
products would adequately account for this potentiality. Manufacturer marks
would enable consumers to locate products of the manufacturers they trust
(and distrust), thereby permitting producers to capture consumer goodwill
across the range of drugs they offer. These marks would accomplish this
objective without suggesting that the drugs they mark differ in any respect
other than their manufacturers. Thus, this rule reinforces for consumers the
reality surrounding branded and generic drugs: branded and generic drugs
are equivalent medications, albeit with sometimes different manufacturers.
To implement such a rule would most likely require two changes to
existing law. First, a change to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
could require that all drugs be labeled, prescribed, and advertised by their
generic names and dispensed with a label identifying the manufacturer of the
medication. Such a legislative change would require the FDA to set the
names and dress for all drugs and obligate pharmaceutical manufacturers to
comply with the FDA’s such schemes.
In order to avert potential lawsuits, Congress should also amend the
Lanham Act, so that pharmaceutical trademarks and trade dress can no
longer be registered with the USPTO. More specifically, Congress could
amend 15 U.S.C. § 1052, which lists trademark ineligible subject matter, to
specify that trademarks on medications will be refused registration. This pro-
vision could be nested under Section 1052(e)(5), which prohibits trademarks
on “any matter that, as a whole, is functional.” This change might not even
be necessary, however, because 15 U.S.C. § 1051 only permits registration
of a trademark when the applicant can verify that he is “entitled to use the
mark in commerce”225 and has a “bona fide intention to use the mark in
commerce.”226 If pharmaceutical companies must use the drug names au-
thorized by the FDA, and only those names, these companies cannot verify
to the USPTO that they are “entitled” or “intend” to use their own pharma-
ceutical trademarks in commerce.
C. Potential Limitations
i. Constitutional Challenges
Pharmaceutical companies would undoubtedly object to such a rule, and
a few legal challenges are foreseeable. Although it is beyond the scope of
this Article to ponder all such lawsuits, it explores three potential causes of
225. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b)(3)(A) (2012).
226. Id. § 1051(b)(3)(B).
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action—two domestic and one international. First, pharmaceutical firms
might complain that this rule violates the Due Process Clause and Just Com-
pensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. They might argue that they have
a property right to their pharmaceutical trademarks of which the government
has deprived them without due process and taken without just compensation.
The Supreme Court has described trademarks as a form of property on
various occasions. For example, in College Saving Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board,227 the Court stated “[t]he hallmark
of a protected property interest is the right to exclude others. That is ‘one of
the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly character-
ized as property.’”228 The Court then explained that trademarks are “the
‘property’ of the owner because he can exclude others from using them.”229
But a trademark holder’s property interest in his mark is not without
limits. In his trademark treatise, McCarthy explains:
Traditional American trademark law has viewed a trademark as
“property” only insofar as it is a right to prevent confusion of cus-
tomers and the commercial damage that confusion creates. The
American view of trademark law is that it is a form of consumer
protection. This is a key feature distinguishing American trademark
law from that of the Civil Law systems of most other nations. The
Civil Law tradition treats a registered trademark as a form of prop-
erty granted by the government, akin to that of a patent.230
Unlike patents and copyrights, trademarks “have no existence independent
of the good will of the products or services in connection with which the
mark is used.”231 The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] trademark owner has a
property right only insofar as is necessary to prevent customer confusion as
to who produced the goods and to facilitate differentiation of the trademark
owner’s goods.”232 Therefore, a trademark holder does not possess a prop-
erty right to his mark simply because it exists and has been registered with
the USPTO; instead, this property right is co-extensive with its function as
an indicator of source and repository of goodwill.
Potential future pharmaceutical trademarks do not currently indicate a
particular source to consumers and have yet to accrue any goodwill. Accord-
227. 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
228. Id. at 673 (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).
229. Id. (“Trademark law, like contract law, confers private rights, which are themselves
rights of exclusion. It grants the trademark owner a bundle of such rights.” (quoting Kmart
Corp. v. Cartier, 485 U.S. 176, 185-86 (1988))).
230. MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 2:14.
231. Id. § 2:15.
232. Int’l Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 919 (9th Cir.
1980; see also Ky. Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368 (5th Cir.
1977).
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ingly, a prospective law banning pharmaceutical trademarks would be un-
likely to violate either the Due Process Clause or the Just Compensation
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Pharmaceutical companies also hold no general right to create trade-
marks. As previously mentioned, the Constitution makes no provision for
trademarks, unlike patents and copyrights. A company does have a right to
the goodwill the company has accrued. However, that right is cognizable as
a property right to a trademark only insofar as the mark captures the good-
will accrued and enables consumers to identify the product the company
produces.
As companies begin to produce new, non-trademarked drugs, the manu-
facturer mark portion of the proposed rule will ensure that those companies
are able to capture and protect the goodwill those drugs accrue. The manu-
facturer marks will enable consumers to locate the producers of the drugs
they trust, thereby safeguarding any goodwill a company’s drug has at-
tracted.233 Manufacturer marks would essentially protect and embody the
same property rights that trademarks currently do. However, unlike pharma-
ceutical trademarks, these manufacturer marks would focus consumer good-
will on the real source of the drug, rather than an unattributed one. Switching
the locus of consumer goodwill from an unattributed source to an identified
one will help clarify to consumers that generic and branded producers are
selling the same drug, simply produced by different companies.
It is less clear if a retrospective version of this rule would be constitu-
tional. Because pharmaceutical companies have property rights in their cur-
rent trademarks, elimination of these marks might constitute a deprivation of
property without due process of the law. However, if the retrospective rule
allowed branded manufacturers to continue to use their old, trademarked
names in conjunction with the new generic names (for example, Atorvasta-
tin, formerly known as Liptor, by Pfizer), it should survive a Fifth Amend-
ment Due Process Clause challenge because such a rule would continue to
protect the goodwill these brands previously accrued. Because the govern-
ment would not be using the banned pharmaceutical trademarks nor permit-
ting others to use them, a Fifth Amendment Takings cause of action would
be weaker. These marks are not taken; they simply cease to exist.
Pharmaceutical manufacturers would most likely also complain that this
rule violates their First Amendment right to free speech. Relying on Fried-
man v. Rogers,234 these companies would contend that their trademarks con-
233. See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 (1916) (“The redress
that is accorded in trade-mark cases is based upon the party’s right to be protected in the good-
will of a trade or business . . . Courts afford redress or relief upon the ground that a party has a
valuable interest in the good will-of his trade or business, and in the trade-marks adopted to
maintain and extend it.”).
234. 440 U.S. 1, 11 (1979).
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stitute protected commercial speech. In Friedman, the Supreme Court
explained:
Once a trade name has been in use for some time, it may serve to
identify [a particular business] and also to convey information about
the type, price, and quality of services offered for sale [by that busi-
ness]. In each role, the trade name is used as part of a proposal of a
commercial transaction. . . . His purpose is strictly business. The use
of trade names in connection with [particular business], then, is a
form of commercial speech and nothing more.235
In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that “[s]ociety . . . has a strong
interest in the free flow of commercial information, both because the effi-
cient allocation of resources depends upon informed consumer choices and
because ‘even an individual advertisement, though entirely ‘commercial,’
may be of general public interest.’”236 However, the Court also explained
that, unlike other forms of commercial speech, trade names have “no intrin-
sic meaning”237:
A trade name conveys no information about the price and nature of
the services offered by [a business] until it acquires meaning over a
period of time by associations formed in the minds of the public
between the name and some standard of price or quality. Because
these ill-defined associations of trade names with price and quality
information can be manipulated by the users of trade names, there is
a significant possibility that trade names will be used to mislead the
public.238
Like other forms of speech, commercial speech can be subjected to
some forms of government regulation.239 First, “[u]ntruthful speech, com-
mercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake.”240 The
State may also regulate commercial speech that is misleading or decep-
tive.241 And “when experience has proved that in fact [a particular form of]
advertising is subject to abuse, the States may impose appropriate restric-
tions.”242 The Supreme Court’s decision in Central Hudson Gas & Electric
235. Id.
236. Id. at 8-9 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 764 (1976)).
237. Friedman, 440 U.S. at 12.
238. Id. at 12-13.
239. Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770
(1976) (“Some forms of commercial speech regulation are surely permissible.”); Bates v. State
Bar of Az., 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977).
240. Va. State Bd. of Pharm., 425 U.S. at 771.
241. Friedman, 440 U.S. at 14.
242. Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York243 sets forth the analytical
framework used to assess whether a governmental restriction on commercial
speech is permissible:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is pro-
tected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come
within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not
be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted government inter-
est is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must
determine whether the regulation directly advances the government
interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is neces-
sary to serve that interest.244
As the Court further explained, compliance with this third requirement “may
be measured by two criteria. First, the restriction must directly advance the
state interest involved; the regulation may not be sustained if it provides
only ineffective or remote support for the government’s purpose. Second, if
the governmental interest could be served as well by a more limited restric-
tion on commercial speech, the excessive restrictions cannot survive.”245 The
Supreme Court has since clarified that the “direct advancement” requirement
obligates a state to demonstrate that “the harms [the state] recites are real
and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree.”246
Accordingly, if Congress passed a law prohibiting pharmaceutical trade-
marks and this law was challenged under the First Amendment, the govern-
ment would have to show that: (1) its interest in regulating pharmaceutical
trademarks is substantial; and (2) that the harms flowing from these marks
are real, and this prohibition would alleviate these harms to a material de-
gree. The research set forth earlier in this Article suggests that both of these
inquiries can be answered affirmatively. First, the government has a substan-
tial interest in lowering healthcare costs and patient morbidity.247 Second,
the harms resulting from pharmaceutical trademarks are real and could be
alleviated to a substantial degree by a rule prohibiting their use.
In fact, the manufacturer mark rule shares similarities with the free
speech restriction upheld in Friedman. There, the Supreme Court ruled that a
Texas law banning optometrical trade names was valid because there was
substantial evidence that these trade names were being used to mislead con-
243. 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
244. Id. at 566.
245. Id. at 564.
246. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993).
247. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 485 (1995) (stating that the government
has a substantial interest in promoting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens); see also
Pearson, 164 F.3d at 655-56.
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sumers.248 In so holding, the Court noted that “the restriction on the use of
trade names has only the most incidental effect on the content of the com-
mercial speech of Texas optometrists.”249 Thus, Friedman suggests that a
ban on pharmaceutical trademarks may be permissible as long as Congress
relies on the substantial evidence available that pharmaceutical trademarks
are confusing consumers. Implementation of the manufacturer mark rule
would further support the constitutionality of this law because such a policy
would demonstrate that the government left open other avenues for pharma-
ceutical companies to communicate factual and useful information to the
public.
ii. International Challenges
At the international level, pharmaceutical companies will likely argue
that any rule limiting the use of their trademarks and trade dress violates the
trademark provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. In response to Australia’s
plain packaging laws—laws that require tobacco companies to remove all
trademarks from their cartons of cigarettes—several nations250 as well as the
tobacco industry251 have advanced a number of TRIPS-based arguments.252
These legal arguments preview the position the pharmaceutical industry
would likely take should a nation attempt to ban pharmaceutical trademarks.
Articles 15 through 21 of the TRIPS Agreement delineate the scope of
trademark protection under this treaty. First, Article 15 defines protectable
subject matter and then specifically provides that “[t]he nature of the goods
or services to which a trademark is to be applied shall in no case form an
248. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1979) (“The concerns of the Texas Legisla-
ture about the deceptive and misleading uses of optometrical trade names were not speculative
or hypothetical, but were based on experience in Texas with which the legislature was
familiar.”).
249. Id. at 15-16.
250. See Indonesia Becomes Fifth To File WTO Case Against Australia Tobacco Plain-
Packaging, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Sept. 22, 2013, 12:28 PM), http://www.ip-watch.org/2013/
09/22/indonesia-becomes-fifth-to-file-wto-case-against-australia-tobacco-plain-packaging (ex-
plaining that Indonesia, Ukraine, Honduras, Dominican Republic and Cuba have filed suit
against Australia at the WTO).
251. Becky Freeman, Simon Chapman, & Matthew Rimmer, The Case for the Plain
Packaging of Tobacco Products, 103 ADDICTION 580, 585 (2008) (explaining the importance
of packing and trade dress to the tobacco industry).
252. On December 1, 2012, Australia passed the Tobacco Plain Packaging Act of 2011
and became the first nation to ban trade dress on cigarette packaging. Under this law, the brand
name on tobacco cartons is relegated to the bottom of the box in small, plain typeface. See
Reducing the Appeal of Smoking – First Experiences with Australia’s Plain Tobacco Packag-
ing Law, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, http://www.who.int/features/2013/australia_tobacco
_packaging/en/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2015); Emily Allen, Australia To Become First Country
To Introduce Unbranded Cigarette Packets, DAILY MAIL (Nov. 10, 2011 9:38 PM), http://
www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2060019/Australia-country-introduce-unbranded-cigarette-
packets.html.
46 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 22:1
obstacle to registration of the trademark.”253 Article 20 then states that “[t]he
use of a trademark in the course of trade shall not be unjustifiably encum-
bered by special requirements, such as use with another trademark, use in a
special form or use in a manner detrimental to its capability to distinguish
the goods or services of one undertaking from those of other
undertakings.”254
Australia’s plain packaging law has provoked heated debate over the
scope and meaning of these articles. Specifically, whether a “right to use”
trademarks can be implied from the trademark provisions of the TRIPS
agreement. Some scholars argue that TRIPS endows trademark owners with
an inherent right to use their marks.255 Others contend that a “right to use”
cannot be implied from the TRIPS agreement, and therefore the protections
of the TRIPS agreement only come into force when a country decides to
allow trademark use in the first place.256
Irrespective of this debate, there other ways to justify certain bans on
trademark use. Many scholars contend that certain bans can be upheld as
“justifiable” under Article 20.257 As previously mentioned, Article 20 states
that “[t]he use of a trademark in the course of trade shall not be unjustifiably
encumbered by special requirements.”258 Thus far, the World Trade Organi-
zation (“WTO”) has not considered Article 20’s concept of “justifiability” in
any of its jurisprudence.259 Despite this lack of precedent, many lawyers ar-
gue Article 20’s rejection of unjustifiable encumbrances should be read in
light of Article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement.260 Article 8 reads:
Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regula-
tions, adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutri-
tion, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital
253. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 15 § 4,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
254. Id. art. 20.
255. Susy Frankel & Daniel Gervais, Plain Packaging and the Interpretation of the
TRIPS Agreement, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1149, 1149-50 (2013).
256. See Mark Davison, Plain Packaging and the TRIPS Agreement: A Response to Pro-
fessor Gervais, 23 AUSTL. INTELL. PROP. J. 160, 160 (2013); Mark Davison, The Legitimacy of
Plain Packaging Under International Intellectual Property Law: Why There Is no Right To
Use a Trademark Under Either the Paris Convention or the TRIPS Agreement, in PUBLIC
HEALTH AND PLAIN PACKAGING OF CIGARETTES: LEGAL ISSUES 81, 81 (Tania Voon et al. eds.,
2012); Andrew D. Mitchell, Australia’s Move to the Plain Packaging of Cigarettes and Its
WTO Compatibility, 5 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 405, 417 (2010).
257. See Frankel & Gervais, supra note 255, at 1212-13.
258. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 253, art. 20, Marrakesh Agreement, Annex 1C, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299.
259. Mitchell, supra note 256, at 413.
260. See Alberto Alemanno & Enrico Bonadio, Do you Mind My Smoking? Plain Pack-
aging of Cigarettes Under the TRIPS Agreement, 10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 450,
472-74 (2011); Freeman et al., supra note 251; Mitchell, supra note 256, at 413-15.
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importance to their socio-economic and technological development,
provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of
this Agreement.261
Because Article 8 only allows public health measures insofar as they are
“consistent with the provision of [the TRIPS] Agreement,” this article does
not constitute an exception to the other obligations of the TRIPS Agree-
ment.262 “However, Article 8 can provide interpretative guidance on what
would be reasonable for the purposes of Article 20.”263 As paragraph 4 of the
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health explains, “the
TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent members from taking
measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our com-
mitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and
should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO
members’ right to protect public health . . . .”264 Reading Article 20 through
the lens of Article 8 and paragraph 4 of the Doha Declaration suggests that
important public health measures may well constitute justifiable encum-
brances. For example, in European Communities—Protection of Trademarks
and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, the
WTO panel noted that Article 8 “inherently grants Members freedom to pur-
sue legitimate public policy objectives since many measures to attain those
public policy objectives lie outside the scope of intellectual property rights
and do not require an exception under the TRIPS Agreement.”265
Under this line of reasoning, one could argue that a ban on pharmaceuti-
cal trademarks is justifiable under Article 20. Because this proposal would
reduce health care costs, therein increasing a government’s ability to ensure
that its entire population has access to appropriate medications, such a mea-
sure is arguably justifiable under Article 20 of the TRIPS agreement.
261. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 253, art. 20, Marrakesh Agreement, Annex 1C, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299.
262. See Frankel & Gervais, supra note 255, at 1202-03, 1206 (“In regard to plain pack-
aging, the key relevance of Article 8 is not that it is an exception that allows public health
measures that are otherwise inconsistent with the TRIPS Agreement. The key function of Arti-
cle 8 is its relevance to interpreting the object and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement and
applying that to an interpretation of Article 20.”).
263. Mitchell, supra note 256, at 419.
264. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, ¶ 4,
WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (2001).
265. Complaint by the United States, European Communities—Protection of Trademarks
and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, ¶ 7.210, WTO Doc.
WT/DS174/R (Mar. 15, 2005).
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D. Other Options
i. The Functionality Rule
Cognizant of the adverse effects that trade dress has on patient adher-
ence to medication regimens, courts have employed a legal doctrine known
as the functionality rule to invalidate pharmaceutical trade dress.266 Under
this rule, “trade dress protection may not be claimed for product features that
are functional.”267 In 2003, the Third Circuit held that the trade dress of
Adderall, a popular Attention Deficit Hyperactive Disorder (“ADHD”) med-
ication, was functional in Shire U.S. Inc. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc.268 Rely-
ing on the testimony of two experts, the Third Circuit (in an opinion joined
by then-Judge Alito) affirmed the lower court’s determination that ADHD
patients rely on the appearance of their medications for dosage informa-
tion269: “[A] generic drug’s similar appearance to the branded product ‘en-
hance[s] patient safety and compliance with the medically prescribed dosing
regimen.’”270 Because the design of Adderall did not signal the source of the
medication,271 but rather its content and dosage type, the court found its
trade dress to be impermissibly functional.
In reaching this conclusion, the Third Circuit relied on Supreme Court
case law272 clarifying that if a medication’s trade dress is functional, it is
ineligible for trademark protection. The Supreme Court first relied on a
functionality argument to rule against a trade dress infringement claim in
266. See, e.g., Shire U.S. Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 329 F.3d 348 (3d Cir. 2003); Norwich
Pharm. Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 271 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1959); Ives Labs., Inc. v. Darby Drug
Co., 488 F. Supp. 394 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), rev’d, 638 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1981), rev’d sub nom.
Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982), aff’d, 697 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1982).
267. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001).
268. Shire, 329 F.3d at 359.
269. Id. at 354 (“Dr. Bernstein’s declaration explains, inter alia, that because ADHD
patients overuse visual cues, (1) when therapeutically equivalent ADHD products have similar
visual recognition properties, adult ADHD patients will experience less confusion in correctly
identifying the agent and/or its dosage strength; (2) given that almost all patients require some
initial dosage titration and a subsequent substantial majority require intermittent dosage adjust-
ment, the color coding of a particular preparation of mixed amphetamine salts tablets confers a
substantial degree of clinical functionality for the patient in the titration/adjustment process;
(3) many adult patients may take multiple daily dosages of different strength amphetamine
salts tablets, also inferring the usefulness of similar color-coding.”).
270. Id. at 355 (quoting the affadavit of Cheryl D. Blume, Ph.D., expert for the
defendant).
271. See id.
272. Id. at 358 (citing Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 169 (1995)
(“The functionality doctrine . . . protects competitors against a disadvantage (unrelated to rec-
ognition or reputation) that trademark protection might otherwise impose, namely, their inabil-
ity reasonably to replicate important non-reputation-related product features. For example, this
Court has written that competitors might be free to copy the color of a medical pill where that
color serves to identify the kind of medication (e.g., a type of blood medicine) in addition to its
source.”).
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1924. In William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,273 Eli Lilly sued Wil-
liam R. Warner & Co. for copying the trade dress of its product Coco-Qui-
nine, an antimalarial drug (quinine) mixed with chocolate syrup. The
competitor product, Quin-Coco, had similar color, taste, and name to Eli
Lilly’s product. However, the Supreme ruled against Eli Lilly, reasoning that
Coco-Quinine’s chocolate flavor did “not merely serve the incidental use of
identifying the respondent’s preparation,” but rather “supplie[d] the mixture
with a quality of palatability for which there [was] no equally satisfactory
substitute.”274
Furthermore, in Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co. Inc.,275 the
District Court for the Eastern District of New York held that a brand name
manufacturer’s trade dress for the drug cyclandelate was functional because
the company relied on different colors to denote distinct dosage amounts.
The court cited the fact that “some patients co-mingle their drugs in a single
container and then rely on the appearance of the drug to follow their doctors’
instructions.”276 Although the Supreme Court reviewed a different aspect of
this case and did not touch the functionality issue, the Court noted the dis-
trict court’s trade dress finding and later cited it. In Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson
Products Co., the Court explained:
The functionality doctrine . . . protects competitors against a disad-
vantage (unrelated to recognition or reputation) that trademark pro-
tection might otherwise impose, namely, their inability reasonably
to replicate important non-reputation-related product features. For
example, this Court has written that competitors might be free to
copy the color of a medical pill where that color serves to identify
the kind of medication (e.g., a type of blood medicine) in addition to
its source.277
The functionality argument inherently recognizes the basic premise of
this article: consumers do not rely on pharmaceutical trademarks to signal
the source of particular medication; instead they rely on these marks to iden-
tify the type of drug generally. Although the decision to use a color-based
dosage-coding scheme is undeniably “essential to the use or purpose of the
article,” the specific color choices in the scheme are not. A color scheme
consisting of red and blue pills is just as effective as another composed of
green and purple. The only reason a drug company’s specific color choices
have any bearing on a medication’s functionality is because consumers be-
273. 265 U.S. 526 (1924).
274. Id. at 529.
275. Ives Labs., Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 488 F. Supp. 394 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), rev’d, 638
F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1981), rev’d sub nom. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844
(1982), aff’d, 697 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1982).
276. Id. at 399.
277. 514 U.S. 159, 169 (1995).
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come accustomed the company’s specific color scheme over the course of
the drug’s patent term. Therefore, by holding that the specific colors in a
company’s coding scheme are functional, courts are essentially recognizing
that “genericide”278 is inevitable in the case of pharmaceutical trade dress.
Over the course of a drug’s patent term, patients become so familiar with its
color scheme that they begin to view these colors as signaling information
about the type of product in general rather than its specific source. For ex-
ample, in Shire, patients began to understand the branded color-coding
scheme for Adderall® as providing information about type of drug they
were taking. Courts use the functionality doctrine to address a larger prob-
lem: due to the initial period of market exclusivity branded drugs enjoy,
pharmaceutical trademarks and trade dress inevitably end up signaling type
rather than source to consumers.
Practitioners and scholars have argued that the functionality doctrine can
and should be used in courts to invalidate pharmaceutical trade dress.279
Without disagreeing with this proposal, it should be recognized that the
functionality doctrine’s impact is limited. The functionality argument most
likely can only be used to address trade dress protection. It would be more
difficult to prove that a drug’s name was “essential to the use or purpose of
the device” or “affects the cost or quality of the device.”280
Furthermore, the functionality argument must be asserted on a case by
case basis, usually in response to an infringement suit. Should courts in-
creasingly accept this argument, or, even better, should the Supreme Court
decide pharmaceutical trade dress is functional, generic companies could be-
gin to copy the trade dress of brand name manufacturers without fear of
attracting lawsuits. Nevertheless, litigation based on the functionality argu-
ment still does not provide as complete a change to pharmaceutical trade-
mark policy as would a new rule instituting manufacturer marks. Although
the functionality doctrine is a useful tool, it does not offer a complete solu-
tion to the problem.
ii. FDA Guidance
A second potential fix to the issue of trademarked pharmaceuticals
would be FDA-issued guidance requiring generic producers to copy the
278. Naeve, supra note 130, at 326 (recognizing that the functionality argument in trade
dress cases blurs the concepts of secondary meaning and functionality: “The trade dress is
‘functional’ because it now represents a type of medication. The effort that was required to
gain protection now negates that same protection. If this is a desired result, then the shape and
color of a drug should be regulated by the FDA along with the generic approval process, rather
than by applying circular reasoning for secondary meaning and functionality and blurring these
with the parallel purpose of genericide.”).
279. See Alfred B. Engelberg, Have Prescription Drug Brand Names Become Generic?,
20 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 867, 867 (2014); Kesselheim, et al., supra note 203, at 101; Engel-
berg, supra note 180, at 321.
280. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 33 (2001).
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trade dress of the brand name reference products. A recent paper studying
pharmaceutical trademarks explains that “[i]n principle, the FDA could re-
quire new generic applicants to make the shape and color of their pills con-
form to the brand name reference listed drug.” The authors note that formal
rulemaking or legislative changes to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act “should not be necessary” because “[f]ederal law gives the FDA the
authority to reject applications for generic drugs where ‘the composition of
the drug is unsafe under such conditions because of . . . the manner in which
the inactive ingredients are included,’ which would cover the appearance of
the pill.”281 Thus, the FDA can and should encourage, if not require, generic
manufacturers to adopt the same trade dress as their brand name reference
products.
The appeal of this solution is its relative simplicity: it requires no new
law to be passed, and no case to be won. However, like the litigation strat-
egy, such guidance would only solve part (although not a small part) of the
problem. This guidance would not deal with the issue of trademarked phar-
maceutical names. Nevertheless, this option, like the litigation strategy,
should be pursued. Both of these approaches have the power to significantly
lessen the inefficiencies pharmaceutical trade dress generates and could be
used as stopgap measures until more comprehensive reform can be achieved.
CONCLUSION
In the pharmaceutical industry, trademark and trade dress protection
have led many patients to believe that brand name and generic drugs truly
differ. This differentiation is not grounded in rational concerns regarding
manufacturing quality. Instead, a more nebulous and pernicious psychologi-
cal reaction accounts for consumer preferences. This Article contends that
pharmaceutical trademarks and trade dress not only fail to accomplish the
core goals of trademark protection, but also undermine them. In differentiat-
ing their drugs from generic products, brand name companies ultimately
confuse consumers, leading them to believe that branded and generic drugs
are distinct products. This confusion, in turn, impedes effective generic com-
petition and reduces patient adherence to prescription drug regimens, ulti-
mately increasing health care costs and morbidity. The replacement of
pharmaceutical trademarks and trade dress with manufacturers’ marks would
greatly reduce the negative psychological impact associated with pharma-
ceutical advertising while still enabling consumers to ascertain the source of
their medications.
Furthermore, the concerns expressed in this Article foreshadow a poten-
tially greater naming problem on the horizon. This past August, the FDA
released its Draft Guidance for naming biosimilar products—the generic
281. Kesselheim, supra note 203, at 101 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(4)(H)(ii)).
52 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 22:1
versions of biologic medications.282 The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”)
just responded to this draft guidance, voicing strong concerns that the FDA
proposal could lead to exactly the type of confusion this Article describes.283
As the FTC report explains, “FTC staff is concerned that FDA’s proposal—
to assign different suffixes to the drug substance names of biosimilars and
their reference biologics—could result in physicians incorrectly believing
that biosimilars’ drug substances differ in clinically meaningful ways from
their reference biologics’ drug substances, especially since differences in
drug substance names have traditionally connoted meaningful differences in
drug substances. A misperception that the drug substance in a biosimilar
differs in clinically meaningful ways from that in the reference biologic
could deter physicians from prescribing biosimilars, thus impeding the de-
velopment of biosimilar markets and competition.”284 The problem described
in this Article and the recent FTC report will only continue to grow in signif-
icance as biologic patents expire and biosimilars rush onto the market. As a
result, it is imperative that policy makers begin to address the confusion
trademarked pharmaceutical create and consider eliminating them
altogether.
282. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, NONPROPRIETARY NAMING OF BIOLOGICAL
PRODUCTS: DRAFT GUIDANCE (Aug. 2015), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/
guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/guidances/ucm459987.pdf.
283. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, COMMENT OF THE STAFF OF THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION SUBMITTED TO THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES, IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON ITS GUIDANCE FOR
INDSUTRY ON THE “NONPROPRIETARY NAMING OF BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS; DRAFT GUIDANCE
FOR INDUSTRY; AVAILABILITY” (Oct. 27, 2015), available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-comment-submitted-food-drug-administration-re-
sponse-fdas-request-comments-its-guidance/151028fdabiosimilar.pdf.
284. Id. at 2.
